Canonizado v. Ordoñez Benitez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Bernarda S. Canonizado sought to compel the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to issue an alias writ of execution for past support and to order the payment of current support. The Court of Appeals had previously ordered the respondent to provide monthly support of P100.00, which became final and executory on January 21, 1969. Despite several writs of execution issued for arrearages totaling P27,900.00 (later determined as P16,150.00 for their daughter Christina and P17,200.00 for petitioner), these were returned unsatisfied. Procedural History: The parties entered into several compromise agreements, notably one on July 11, 1973, acknowledging arrears of P17,200.00 and stipulating monthly payments for current support. However, the respondent failed to fully comply. Petitioner filed motions for execution and contempt, which were repeatedly deferred due to respondent's promises to pay. On September 14, 1977, the respondent judge denied the motion for an alias writ of execution, citing the lapse of over seven years from the finality of the judgment to the filing of the motion, thus arguing it could no longer be executed by motion under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. The judge also noted that the daughter, Christina, had reached majority. The Petition: Petitioner filed two petitions for mandamus. The first (G.R. No. L-49315) sought to compel the issuance of an alias writ of execution based on a writ issued on July 22, 1976. The second (G.R. No. 60966) prayed for an order compelling the respondent judge to act on her motion for current support and to enjoin the hearing of the respondent's motion to terminate support.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge can be compelled by mandamus to issue an alias writ of execution for the payment of arrearages in support, despite the lapse of more than five years from the finality of the judgment. Whether the respondent judge can be compelled by mandamus to act on the petitioner's motion for payment of current support.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition in G.R. No. L-49315, ordering the issuance of the alias writ of execution, and dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 60966. The respondent judge was ordered to set the case for hearings on the continuing need for current support.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issuance of an alias writ of execution: The Court held that the petitioner has a clear right to the writ and it is the imperative duty of the respondent judge to perform the act required. The judgment for support does not become dormant, and the five-year period for execution by motion under Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules of Court does not apply. This is because the obligation to provide support is a continuing one, and the court never loses jurisdiction to enforce it. The series of compromise agreements entered into by the parties did not waive the respondent's obligation but merely provided for deferment of payment. Therefore, the petitioner was merely enforcing a vested right when she asked for the writ of execution. The Court cited Gumba v. Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and Velayo v. Velayo in support of its ruling. On the payment of current support: The Court ruled that the respondent judge cannot be compelled by mandamus to order the payment of current support when the respondent alleges grounds for the suspension of such obligation. Article 303 of the New Civil Code provides circumstances under which the obligation to give support may cease, such as when the recipient can engage in a trade, profession, or industry, or has obtained work, or has improved their fortune. In this case, it was undisputed that the petitioner had become a member of the bar and was employed by the Central Bank. Therefore, the respondent could rightfully file a motion to oppose the payment of current support or to terminate its demandability for the time being. The determination of whether the petitioner is still entitled to support is a matter of evidence for the lower court to decide, as a judgment for support is never final and its demandability may be suspended or re-enforced based on existing circumstances.
Main Doctrine
A judgment for support does not become dormant and the five-year period for executing it by motion does not apply thereto, as the obligation is continuing and the court never loses jurisdiction to enforce the same. Furthermore, the demandability of support may be suspended or re-enforced when appropriate circumstances exist, which determination is subject to presentation of evidence.