Ubarra v. Tecson
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Complainant Manuel T. Ubarra filed a complaint against respondent Judge Jose H. Tecson for delay in resolving a Motion to Dismiss and for issuing two restraining orders. The case originated from an ejectment suit filed by Ubarra's client, Francisco Guballa, Sr., against his tenant, Emiterio Mozar. After a series of appeals, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari, making the judgment executory. Procedural History: To forestall the execution of the judgment, Mozar filed a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of First Instance, assigned to respondent's sala. Respondent Judge issued a restraining order on August 31, 1982. Ubarra filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 20, 1982, which was deemed submitted for resolution on the same date. Respondent Judge failed to resolve this motion within the 90-day reglementary period. Subsequently, respondent Judge issued a second restraining order on February 28, 1983, after the first had expired. The Petition: The complaint charged Judge Tecson with gross ignorance of the law, obvious partiality, incompetence, undue delay in resolving pending incidents, and grave abuse in the issuance of restraining orders.
Issue(s)
Whether respondent Judge was guilty of undue delay in resolving pending incidents. Whether respondent Judge committed grave abuse in issuing the second restraining order. Whether the respondent Judge's actions constitute gross ignorance of the law, obvious partiality, incompetence, or undue delay.
Ruling
The Supreme Court found respondent Judge guilty of undue delay in resolving pending incidents and grave abuse in issuing restraining orders. Considering that the respondent Judge had already retired and was of advanced age, the Court imposed a fine equivalent to his three (3) months' salary instead of suspension.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of undue delay in resolving pending incidents: The Court found that respondent Judge admitted the delay in resolving several incidents, including a Motion to Dismiss, a Motion for Leave to Intervene, a Motion to File Supplemental Petition, and an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. These incidents were submitted for resolution on September 20, 1982, but remained unresolved as of March 7, 1983, well beyond the 90-day reglementary period. The respondent's explanation that the delay was due to protracted attempts at amicable settlement was deemed shallow and unsubstantiated, as the complainant vehemently denied any such negotiations. The Court emphasized that even if settlement negotiations were ongoing, the judge should have placed on record an order to that effect or required the parties to file a motion, and fixed a deadline for the settlement, especially in an ejectment case where speedy disposal is a matter of public policy. The inaction or procrastination gave room for suspicion of partiality and failed to preserve faith in the administration of justice. Delay in resolving motions within the 90-day period is not excusable and should not be condoned, as held in Pineda vs. Dalocanog. On the issue of grave abuse in issuing the second restraining order: The Court held that the issuance of a second restraining order after the first had expired was in violation of Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 224. This law mandates that a restraining order is effective only for twenty days, and within that period, the judge must cause an order to be served on the defendant to show cause why the injunction should not be granted and must determine whether to grant the preliminary injunction within the same period. A restraining order automatically loses its efficacy after twenty days without the need for a judicial order, as established in A.B. Dionisio, et al vs. CFI, Cotabato, Branch II. The respondent Judge failed to follow this clear mandate of the law. On the charges of incompetence, partiality, and gross ignorance of law: The Court concluded that the infractions of undue delay and grave abuse in issuing restraining orders absorbed the charges of incompetence, partiality, and gross ignorance of law. The respondent Judge's failure to act within the prescribed period and his improper issuance of the second restraining order demonstrated a lack of diligence and adherence to procedural rules. Judges are expected to keep abreast with law and jurisprudence and be familiar with changes in the law and latest decisions, as stated in Fajota vs. Balonso and Ajeno vs. Inserts. The respondent's actions indicated a failure to meet these standards.
Main Doctrine
Judges are expected to keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, including changes in law and latest decisions. Failure to act on matters submitted within the prescribed period and the improper issuance of restraining orders constitute undue delay and grave abuse, respectively, which may warrant penalties even after retirement.