Vda. de Hoyo-a v. Virata
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case concerns two injunction actions filed in 1978 by Marciana Vda. de Hoyo-a and her eight children against Dominador Virata. The petitioners sought to prevent Virata from occupying portions of two homesteads, totaling sixteen and eight hectares, which were applied for by Marciana's deceased husband and by Marciana herself. These homesteads are situated in Sitio Labilabi, Barrio Mabini, Escalante, Negros Occidental. 2. Procedural History: Initially, the trial court dismissed the two cases as premature in an order dated April 19, 1978. After a motion for reconsideration, the cases were reconsidered by Judge Corpuz-Macandog in an order dated December 18, 1981. Subsequently, on February 20, 1984, Virata was declared in default by Judge Severino C. Aguilar upon the petitioners' ex parte motion. Virata's motion to set aside this default order was denied on June 19, 1984, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration of that denial was also denied. Judge Aguilar did not give due course to Virata's appeal from the denial order, and the case proceeded with the reception of petitioners' evidence. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Marciana Hoyo-a and her children, are assailing a resolution dated April 10, 1985, issued by the Intermediate Appellate Court. This resolution, obtained by Virata, directed the trial court to elevate the records of the two cases. The petitioners argue that the order denying Virata's motion to set aside the order of default is not appealable as it is an interlocutory order, and therefore, the Appellate Court erred in requiring the elevation of the records and in giving due course to the appeal.
Issue(s)
Whether an order denying a motion to set aside an order of default is appealable. Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in requiring the trial court to elevate the records of the cases.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The resolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is set aside, and the records of the two cases are remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Virata is given an unextendible period of ten (10) days from notice of the finality of this judgment to answer the complaints. If Virata does not file an answer, the order of default shall stand, and Mrs. Hoyo-a may continue the presentation of her evidence.
Ratio Decidendi
On the appealability of an order denying a motion to set aside an order of default: The Supreme Court held that an order denying a motion to set aside an order of default is not appealable. This is because such an order is interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory order is one that does not finally determine the rights of the parties but leaves something further to be done in the action. In this case, the trial court had yet to render a judgment by default, which would be the final determination of the rights of the parties based on the default. Therefore, an appeal from the denial of the motion to set aside the default order would be premature. The Court cited Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, which specifies that an appeal may be taken from an order that disposes of the action or proceeding, and not from an interlocutory order. The ruling in Abesames vs. Garcia was also referenced to support this principle. The Court emphasized that to allow an appeal at this stage would unduly delay the disposition of the cases, which had already been pending since 1978. On the Intermediate Appellate Court's resolution: The Supreme Court found that the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in requiring the trial court to elevate the records of the two cases. Given that the order denying the motion to set aside the order of default was not appealable, the appellate court should not have taken cognizance of the appeal or issued an order directing the elevation of the records. The proper course of action was for the trial court to proceed with the case, either by rendering a judgment by default or by allowing the defendant to file an answer if the circumstances warranted. The appellate court's intervention at this stage was deemed an improper exercise of its jurisdiction, especially considering the procedural posture of the case where a default had been declared and an appeal from the denial of the motion to set it aside was being considered. The Court's decision to remand the records to the lower court for further proceedings underscores the principle that appeals should only be entertained when a final judgment or order has been rendered.
Main Doctrine
An order denying a motion to set aside an order of default is interlocutory and therefore not appealable, as the trial court still needs to render a judgment by default.