Quesada v. Vicuña
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Fabian R. Millar subdivided Lot 8 into fourteen smaller lots, including Lot 8-N, which bordered a national road. Lots 8-A and 8-B, adjacent to each other and Lot 8-N, were sold to Jose Eleazar and subsequently to the private respondents-appellees. Lot 8-A faced the national highway, while Lot 8-B, situated behind Lot 8-A, was an interior lot. A barbed-wire fence was erected along Lot 8-N in 1949-1950, and this lot, largely swampy and planted with trees, was not used as a road. In 1968, the private respondents began constructing apartments on Lots 8-A and 8-B. In the same year, the petitioners-appellants demolished the barbed-wire fence on Lot 8-N and replaced it with a concrete wall. 2. Procedural History: On September 4, 1968, the private respondents filed a civil case seeking a right of way through Lot 8-N and a preliminary mandatory injunction to compel the petitioners to open the lot. The trial court granted the injunction on November 20, 1968. The petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. They then filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals, arguing the trial judge acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals initially set aside the trial court's order on July 3, 1969, finding no recent act that breached the status quo, as the lot had been fenced for 18 years. However, upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeals, on November 18, 1969, reversed its decision, granting the injunction. It reasoned that the recent construction of a concrete wall by the petitioners breached the status quo and that there was an urgent necessity for the injunction due to the apartment construction. The Court of Appeals subsequently denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on February 11, 1970. 3. The Petition: The petitioners-appellants filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court on March 23, 1970, challenging the Court of Appeals' resolution of November 18, 1969, which reinstated the preliminary mandatory injunction. The Supreme Court gave due course to the petition. However, during the pendency of this petition, the main case (Civil Case No. 7226) proceeded, resulting in a decision by the trial court on August 20, 1970, declaring Lot 8-N a permanent road lot and ordering damages. This decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on February 28, 1980, and subsequently denied a petition for review by the Supreme Court on October 15, 1980. Consequently, the Supreme Court, on November 5, 1970, considered the present petition moot and academic, as the underlying dispute had been definitively resolved.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for certiorari concerning the validity of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is rendered moot and academic by the subsequent decision on the merits of the main case. Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review on certiorari as moot and academic, without costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition because the main case, Civil Case No. 7226, had already been decided on the merits. The trial court's decision declaring Lot 8-N a road lot and making the preliminary mandatory injunction permanent was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Consequently, the petition for certiorari, which sought to annul an interlocutory order (the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction), had become moot and academic. The Court reiterated that once the main case is resolved, any incident related to it, such as the propriety of an injunction, loses its purpose. On Issue 2: Although the petition was dismissed on the ground of mootness, the Court's narrative implicitly addresses the second issue by detailing the progression of the case. The Court of Appeals, in its resolution dated November 18, 1969, found merit in the respondents' motion for reconsideration. It reasoned that the construction of the concrete wall by the petitioners was a recent act that breached the status quo, which was previously characterized by a barbed-wire fence. The Court emphasized the urgent necessity for the writ due to the ongoing construction of the apartment building and the lack of feasible access for construction materials. Furthermore, the Court corrected its earlier assessment, noting from the subdivision plan (Pcs-2261) and the respondents' certificate of title that Lot 8-N was indeed a road lot, thereby establishing a clearer right for the respondents.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for review on certiorari as moot and academic because the main case, Civil Case No. 7226, had already been decided on the merits by the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the subsequent petition for review on certiorari of that decision was denied by the Supreme Court. Therefore, the issue regarding the validity of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, which was the subject of the present petition, had become moot.