Bautista v. Sarmiento
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns an accusation of estafa against Fe J. Bautista and Milagros J. Corpus. The prosecution alleged that the petitioners received jewelry from Dr. Leticia C. Yap on consignment in April 1975, with the agreement that they would sell the items on commission and remit the proceeds or return the unsold jewelry. The petitioners allegedly failed to do either, resulting in a loss of P77,300.00 to Dr. Yap. 2. Procedural History: An information for estafa was filed against Fe Bautista, Milagros Corpus, and Teresita Vergere before the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. Teresita Vergere was granted a separate trial. After the prosecution presented its sole witness, Dr. Leticia C. Yap, the petitioners (Fe Bautista and Milagros Corpus) filed a motion to dismiss, styled as a demurrer to the evidence, arguing that the prosecution had not proven their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The respondent Judge, Malcolm G. Sarmiento, denied this motion in an order dated June 3, 1976, finding that a prima facie case had been established. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. This led to the filing of the present special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, Fe J. Bautista and Milagros J. Corpus, filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, assailing the respondent Judge's denial of their motion to dismiss. They contend that the denial of their demurrer to evidence, based on a finding of a prima facie case, was an improper exercise of judicial authority, as conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not merely a prima facie showing. They argue that the respondent Judge should have dismissed the case. The Supreme Court, however, ruled that certiorari was an improper remedy for an interlocutory order and that the denial of a demurrer to evidence, when a prima facie case is established, requires the defense to present its evidence, as the burden of evidence shifts, not the burden of proof.
Issue(s)
Whether certiorari is the proper remedy to assail an interlocutory order denying a demurrer to evidence. Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the demurrer to evidence and finding a prima facie case. Whether the denial of the demurrer to evidence, based on a prima facie case, shifts the burden of evidence to the defense, and the procedure after denial of demurrer.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The order complained of is well-taken, and there was no grave abuse of discretion in its issuance. The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga is ordered to continue immediately with the trial of Criminal Case No. 808 until its final disposition.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari: The Court held that a petition for certiorari is generally improper to assail an interlocutory order, such as the denial of a demurrer to evidence. Such an order does not finally determine the rights of the parties and should be raised on appeal after trial. However, an exception exists when the order constitutes an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. In this case, even granting the exception, certiorari would not lie because there was no arbitrary exercise of judicial authority. On the denial of the demurrer to evidence and the existence of a prima facie case: The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge. The information alleged that the jewelry was received on consignment, to be sold on commission, with the obligation to remit proceeds or return the items. The offended party testified that the accused acted as her agents. The defense's contention that it was a sale was deemed to overlook the consignment aspect. Furthermore, Exhibits B and B-1, a letter of demand, were presented to establish prior demand, which was made after several oral demands. The respondent Judge correctly found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case sufficient to warrant the presentation of evidence by the defense. On the shift in the burden of evidence and procedure after denial of demurrer: The Court clarified the concept of a prima facie case. It is that amount of evidence sufficient to warrant a conviction if not rebutted. While conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, the denial of a demurrer to evidence based on a prima facie case shifts the burden of evidence to the defense, not the burden of proof. The burden of proof remains with the prosecution. The defense must adduce evidence to meet and nullify the prima facie case. Refusal or failure to present evidence after a prima facie case is established justifies an inference of guilt, as it becomes incumbent upon the defense to prove their innocence or raise reasonable doubt. The Court affirmed the procedure of requiring the defense to present evidence after the denial of a demurrer to evidence. This is consistent with the constitutional right of the accused to be heard in their defense before sentence is pronounced. The case of Arbriol vs. Homeres was cited, holding that if a motion for dismissal is denied, the court should proceed to hear the evidence for the defense. The defense has the option to present evidence or waive it.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari is improper to assail an interlocutory order denying a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence, as such order does not finally determine the rights of the parties and should be raised on appeal after trial. However, certiorari may lie if the order constitutes an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. When a prima facie case is established, the burden of evidence shifts to the defense to present countervailing proof, but the burden of proof remains with the prosecution.