People v. Tomotorgo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused-appellant, Jaime Tomotorgo y Alarcon, was charged with parricide for killing his wife, Magdalena de los Santos. Several months prior to the incident, the victim had been persistently asking the accused to sell their conjugal home and transfer to her in-laws' house, which the accused refused. On June 23, 1977, the accused left for his farm and upon returning, found his wife and their three-month-old baby gone. He found them on a trail where he pleaded with his wife to return home, but she refused. When he attempted to take the child, his wife threw the baby on the ground, inciting the accused's anger. He picked up a piece of wood and hit his wife until she fell, complaining of chest pains. He then brought both his wife and child home, where the wife subsequently died despite his efforts. The accused then reported the incident to the barangay captain and surrendered to the police with the weapon used. Procedural History: The accused initially pleaded not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty during the trial, with the assistance of his counsel. The trial court found him guilty of parricide, appreciating three mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, and acting upon an impulse that produced passion and obfuscation. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs. The court also recommended executive clemency after serving the minimum of the medium penalty. The accused appealed the decision. The Petition: The accused-appellant argued that the lower court erred in disregarding its findings of lack of intent to kill, in disregarding Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code regarding penalties when the crime committed differs from the intended one, in not following the proper procedure for determining penalties, and in denying him the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Issue(s)
Whether the accused-appellant is liable for parricide despite allegedly not intending to kill his wife. Whether Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code applies in this case. Whether the accused-appellant is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the accused-appellant is guilty of parricide. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was affirmed, and the recommendation for executive clemency was reiterated.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of liability for parricide despite lack of intent to kill: The Court held that Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that criminal liability is incurred by committing a felony, even if the wrongful act be different from that intended, and the accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious acts. The fact that the appellant intended only to maltreat or inflict physical injuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting, more serious crime of parricide. The Court cited the case of People vs. Climaco Demiar where choking a mother resulted in parricide, emphasizing that the direct and natural consequences of an unlawful act are the offender's responsibility, with lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong being merely a mitigating circumstance. On the applicability of Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code: The Court ruled that Article 49 does not apply to cases where more serious consequences, not intended by the offender, result from his felonious act. Article 49 is applicable only when the crime committed is different from that intended and when the felony committed befalls a different person, as stated in People vs. Albuquerque. In this case, the victim was the accused's wife, and the death was a direct consequence of the assault. Therefore, the accused is liable for parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, not for a lesser offense under Article 49. On entitlement to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law: The Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the accused is not entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This is because the penalty for parricide, as prescribed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, consists of two indivisible penalties: reclusion perpetua to death. As the commission of the act was attended by mitigating circumstances (voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, passion and obfuscation) and no aggravating circumstances, the lesser indivisible penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, was correctly imposed. The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies only to divisible penalties.
Main Doctrine
A person is liable for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act, even if the resulting crime is more serious than what was intended. The lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is, at best, a mitigating circumstance.