Summit Trading v. Avendano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Segundo Pilipinia and Edgardo Mindo acquired two registered lots in San Pedro, Laguna, with an annotation granting them the right to redeem within five years from sale. They sold the lots to Gavino Ortega in February and April 1977. At Ortega's instance, the annotation was cancelled by Judge Avendaño in September 1979, purportedly for conversion into commercial sites, though the lots remained ricelands. Ortega later advised Ernesto Pilipinia (attorney-in-fact for Segundo and Mindo) of a right of first refusal if the lots were sold. Ortega resold the lots to Summit Trading and Development Corporation (Summit Trading) in November 1979. Procedural History: On August 10, 1981, Pilipinia and Mindo filed a complaint against Ortega and Summit Trading for redemption of the lots, depositing P100,000 for the purpose. Ortega was declared in default for failure to answer. Summit Trading was also declared in default. In a judgment by default dated October 29, 1981, Judge Avendaño ordered Pilipinia and Mindo to redeem the lots within 15 days and directed Summit Trading to execute deeds of sale and surrender titles, or the clerk of court to do so. The default judgment was based on the assumption that Summit Trading was duly summoned through Marina Saquilayan, who received the summons on August 28, 1981, and a copy of the judgment on November 13, 1981. Saquilayan was the secretary of the president of Summit Trading, Virgilio P. Balaguer, not the corporate secretary. The Petition: Nineteen days after receiving the decision, Summit Trading filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to improper service of summons under Rule 14, Section 13 of the Rules of Court. The motion was denied. Summit Trading then filed a petition for certiorari, treated as an appeal, arguing the summons was not served on any of the persons listed in Section 13. The Supreme Court noted that while Saquilayan was not explicitly listed, she was the president's secretary and her receipt of the summons led to Summit Trading's awareness of the case and judgment.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Summit Trading despite the summons being served on the president's secretary, who is not explicitly listed in Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Whether the petition for certiorari, treated as an appeal, was filed out of time.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The trial court's judgment is affirmed. Its implementation is ordered. The restraining order is dissolved.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction and service of summons: The Supreme Court held that while Summit Trading was technically correct that there was no strict compliance with Section 13 of Rule 14, which lists specific corporate officers and agents for service of process, the realities of the situation warranted considering the service valid. Marina Saquilayan, as the secretary to the president of Summit Trading, could be regarded as an "agent" within the meaning of Section 13, especially since her receipt of the summons and subsequent notification of the judgment led to Summit Trading's actual knowledge of the case. The Court distinguished this case from others where summons was served on mere clerks or employees who could not be relied upon to forward the legal documents. In this instance, the president's secretary could have easily notified the president, just as she had apprised him of the judgment. Therefore, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over Summit Trading. On the timeliness of the petition: The Court found that the petition for certiorari, treated as an appeal under Republic Act No. 5440, was filed out of time. Even if considered as a special civil action under Rule 65, it was baseless because the trial court had properly acquired jurisdiction over Summit Trading through the valid service of summons on the president's secretary.
Main Doctrine
Service of summons on the president's secretary may be considered valid service upon a corporation under Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, when the secretary's receipt of the summons leads to the corporation's actual notice of the suit, particularly when the corporation subsequently files a motion for reconsideration after receiving notice of the judgment.