Lina v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondent Northern Motors, Inc. filed a collection suit with damages against petitioner Alex Lina. Petitioner was served summons on April 22, 1982, with the reglementary period to file an answer expiring on May 7, 1982. Procedural History: On May 5, 1982, petitioner filed a motion for extension of twenty days from May 7, 1982, to file his answer. On May 8, 1982, private respondent filed a motion to declare petitioner in default. On May 19, 1982, petitioner filed an opposition to the motion to declare him in default, attaching a copy of his motion for extension, which the court received on the same day. On May 26, 1982, the respondent judge issued an order declaring petitioner in default and allowing private respondent to adduce evidence ex parte. On May 27, 1982, petitioner filed his answer. On July 28, 1982, the respondent court rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. On August 11, 1982, petitioner filed a motion to set aside the decision, which was denied on August 25, 1982. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari/prohibition with the Court of Appeals, which was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme Court, raising issues on grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the order of default and the propriety of certiorari when meritorious defenses exist.
Issue(s)
Whether or not the order of default was issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Whether or not certiorari is proper in a case where judgment by default was rendered without an order of default being furnished petitioner and where meritorious defenses exist, which are for the trial court to evaluate and which evaluation was not done in this case.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of default: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the granting of additional time to file an answer is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. While courts are encouraged to be flexible, defendants should not assume that appellate courts will grant relief if a trial court refuses an extension. In this case, the petitioner filed his motion for extension two days before the deadline, and the respondent court declared him in default upon motion of the private respondent. Although the motion for extension was filed and received by the court before the order of default was issued, the court's order granting the default implicitly denied the motion for extension. The Court reiterated that the defense should not be lulled into believing that appellate courts will always grant relief when trial courts refuse extensions, citing Naga Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in the trial court's action. On the propriety of certiorari: The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that certiorari was not the proper remedy. The Court emphasized that when a judgment by default has been rendered, the defendant has plain, adequate, and speedy remedies in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion for new trial under Rule 37 or a petition for relief under Rule 38, before the judgment becomes final and executory. If the judgment has become final and executory, a petition for relief under Rule 38 is available. Alternatively, the defendant may appeal the judgment under Rule 41. The Court found that the petitioner failed to avail himself of these ordinary remedies and instead resorted to certiorari, which was deemed inappropriate. The Court cited the principle that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal when the latter is available and adequate, as stated by the Court of Appeals.
Main Doctrine
The granting of additional time within which to file an answer to a complaint is a matter largely addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. While trial courts are persuaded, as a matter of policy, to adopt a basically flexible attitude in favor of the defendant in this area of our adjective law, the defense should never be lulled into the belief that whenever trial courts refuse a second request for extension to file an answer, the appellate courts will grant relief. Furthermore, certiorari is not a proper remedy when a plain, adequate, and speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law, such as a petition for relief or an appeal, is available.