Hildawa v. Minister of Defense
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Isidro T. Hildawa and Ricardo C. Valmonte filed separate petitions seeking the nullity of an alleged executive/administrative order creating "secret marshals" or "crimebusters" with authority to kill suspected criminals. They argued this violated constitutional provisions on due process, equal protection, presumption of innocence, right to be heard, right against self-incrimination, and prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Procedural History: Not applicable as this is a direct petition to the Supreme Court. The Petition: Petitioners prayed for a restraining order to recall the "crimebusters" and to declare the order creating them null and void, seeking a permanent injunction against their operation.
Issue(s)
Whether the creation and fielding of "secret marshals" or "crimebusters" with authority to kill are violative of the New Constitution. Whether the respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in creating and deploying such teams, and the subsequent actions taken by these teams.
Ruling
The Court directed respondents to exercise strict supervision and control over the special operation teams, ordering that members should not use unnecessary force, comply strictly with the law, and accord suspects all their constitutional rights. It further enjoined immediate reporting to superior officers and the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for investigation and appropriate action in cases of death or injury resulting from apprehension.
Ratio Decidendi
On the legality of "secret marshals" and "crimebusters" and the alleged "license to kill" and constitutional violations: The Court affirmed that the creation and deployment of special operation teams to combat the resurgence of criminality are lawful, but strongly cautioned against granting these teams a "license to kill," deeming it uncivilized and violative of the fundamental law and universal human rights. The Court emphasized that while the police's job is to apprehend violators, they cannot act as prosecutors, judges, and executioners. Violence is not supported in a democratic society where the rule of law prevails, and every person is entitled to due process. The respondents denied the existence of any executive or administrative order authorizing secret marshals to shoot and disable suspected criminals, stating they are subject to the same laws as other peace officers. The Court noted that petitioners failed to present any copy of such an order. The Court stressed that violence is not a solution in a democratic society and that due process must always be observed. The Court highlighted that when a person is killed, the burden of proving self-defense rests on the assailant. On the actions taken by "crimebusters" and the need for investigation: The Solicitor General reported that from May 4 to May 9, 1985, fifteen alleged holduppers were killed by policemen, and cases were filed with the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO). The Court directed the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) to investigate such killings to determine the assailant and the reason for death, without waiting for a formal complaint. Once the killer's identity is established and they admit authorship, a case must be filed in the proper court to determine if the killing was in self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of a stranger, or in the fulfillment of a duty.
Main Doctrine
While the creation and deployment of special operation teams to counter criminality are lawful, the use of unnecessary force or granting a license to kill is violative of fundamental law and constitutional rights, necessitating strict supervision and adherence to due process.