Salvador v. Salamanca
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Complainant Zenaida C. Salvador and others filed a complaint for forcible entry against Lily Arreza, Antonio Co, Domingo Co, and Lucio Co before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. The plaintiffs also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to regain possession of the premises. 2. Procedural History: The forcible entry case, Civil Case No. 073308, was raffled to respondent Judge Bienvenido S. Salamanca. After the parties rested their case on April 5, 1984, and submitted their memoranda, the respondent judge deferred action on the motion for preliminary injunction on May 16, 1984, stating the case was submitted for decision. Despite the complainant's manifestation of the defendants' failure to submit their memorandum and a subsequent motion for resolution on June 25, 1984, the respondent judge did not render a decision. The instant petition was filed on September 20, 1984. The respondent judge filed a comment, explaining the delays by stating the case was deemed submitted for decision only after the lapse of specific periods for memorandum submission. A reply was filed by the complainant on October 29, 1984, and a decision in the underlying civil case was finally rendered on November 19, 1984. 3. The Petition: The complainant filed a petition charging the respondent judge with culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency for the alleged delay in resolving the forcible entry case and the motions for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The petition argued that the respondent judge failed to act with the dispatch required by law, particularly concerning the urgent nature of injunctions in forcible entry cases, and that the justification provided for the delay was contradicted by the judge's own orders.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge committed culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency due to the delay in resolving the forcible entry case and the motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Whether the respondent judge correctly deferred action on the motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Ruling
The Court found the respondent judge guilty of culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency for the delay in the resolution of both the motion for preliminary injunction and the case itself. The respondent judge is reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of a similar act will be dealt with more severely. The Court ordered that copies of the resolution be attached to his records.
Ratio Decidendi
On the delay in resolving the motion for preliminary injunction and the case: The Court unequivocally established that there was a delay in the resolution of both the motions for preliminary injunction and the case itself. The urgency of relief sought through a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in a forcible entry case necessitates prompt resolution. Section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court specifically mandates its disposition within thirty days from filing, a requirement the respondent judge failed to meet. The respondent judge's justification that the case was deemed submitted only after the lapse of five days from the defendants' receipt of an order granting them an extension to file a memorandum was contradicted by his own order of May 16, 1984, which stated the case had already been submitted for resolution. The Court reiterated the principle that cases should be deemed submitted for resolution at the end of the period agreed upon by the parties for the submission of memoranda, and the non-submission of memoranda does not justify a failure to decide cases, as it is not an essential pleading and its absence is considered a waiver of the privilege. The Court emphasized that cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature and require prompt restoration of social order, thus procedural technicalities causing delay should be avoided. Furthermore, under the Rules on Summary Procedure, memoranda are prohibited, rendering the respondent judge's reliance on memorandum submission as a trigger for the decision period erroneous. On the respondent judge's deferral of action on the motion for preliminary injunction: The Court found the respondent judge's deferral of action on the motion for preliminary injunction to be improper. The respondent judge's order of May 16, 1984, stated that the case had already been submitted for decision and that action on the injunction motion was deferred because it was based on factual allegations to be resolved in the decision on the merits. However, the Court pointed out that the urgency of a preliminary mandatory injunction in a forcible entry case demands immediate action, as provided for in Section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which requires resolution within thirty days. The respondent judge's justification that the injunction's resolution depended on the merits of the main case was contrary to the summary nature of forcible entry proceedings and the specific rules governing injunctions in such cases. The Court also noted that the respondent judge's own order indicated the case was already submitted, making the deferral based on pending factual resolution questionable. The Court's holding in Bendesula v. Laya was cited to support the principle that judges should decide cases even if parties fail to submit memoranda, implying that procedural delays should not impede the resolution of urgent matters like injunctions.
Main Doctrine
Judges are expected to resolve cases and motions with dispatch, especially in summary proceedings like forcible entry, and failure to do so constitutes culpable dereliction of duty and gross inefficiency. Non-submission of memoranda does not justify the delay in rendering a decision.