Milano v. Employees' Compensation Commission
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The late Samuel Milano, employed by the government since 1955 and later as an administrative assistant at the Katipunan National Agricultural School, began experiencing vague epigastric pain in early 1975. This pain was diagnosed as a penetrating duodenal ulcer. Subsequently, he was hospitalized in February 1977 with ascites, significant weight loss, and epigastric discomfort, where he was diagnosed with cancer of the pancreas with metastases. He passed away on March 15, 1977, due to cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to pancreatic cancer. 2. Procedural History: Following Samuel Milano's death, his widow, Lydia D. Milano, filed a claim for death benefits with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The GSIS denied the claim, stating the decedent's illness was not an occupational disease. A subsequent request for reconsideration was also denied. The claimant then appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the GSIS decision and dismissed the appeal. This led to the present petition for review before the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to overturn the ECC's decision. The petitioner argues that her husband's duodenal ulcers, which she contends were contracted before the effectivity of the New Labor Code on January 1, 1975, were the proximate cause of his death. She relies on the principles of presumption of compensability and aggravation, which were grounds under the former Workmen's Compensation Act. The petitioner contends that the work-related stress, including irregular meal times, contributed to his ailments. The Supreme Court, however, notes that the earliest medical treatment record for Milano's ailments dates from November 1976, placing the illness under the purview of the new law, which requires proof that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by working conditions, a burden the petitioner failed to meet as cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease and the alleged work conditions are not peculiar to his employment or causative of the disease.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner sufficiently proved that the decedent's illness was an occupational disease or that the risk of contracting it was increased by his working conditions under the Labor Code. Whether the petitioner could still avail of the presumption of compensability and the principle of aggravation under the former Workmen's Compensation Act.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of occupational disease and increased risk: The Court held that under Article 165 of the Labor Code, as elucidated by Rule III, Section 1(b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, for a sickness to be compensable, it must either be an occupational disease listed in Annex "A" of the Rules, or the claimant must prove that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions. Cancer of the pancreas is not listed as an occupational disease, and the petitioner failed to present any evidence, medical or otherwise, to establish that Milano's work as a bookkeeper or administrative assistant increased his risk of contracting this particular cancer. The Court noted that cancer is generally of unknown origin and can affect individuals from all walks of life, and there is no known medical literature linking bookkeeping or administrative work to an increased risk of pancreatic cancer. The petitioner's allegation that her husband had to take meals at odd hours or skip them due to work pressure was deemed insufficient, as such conditions are not peculiar to his occupation and are not causative factors of pancreatic cancer. The GSIS's observation that many employees are exposed to similar adverse conditions without contracting pancreatic cancer further supported this conclusion. On the applicability of the former Workmen's Compensation Act: The Court clarified that the petitioner's arguments based on the presumption of compensability and the principle of aggravation are applicable only under the former Workmen's Compensation Act, not the current Labor Code. The records showed that Milano's earliest period of treatment for epigastric pain, described as having a "6 months duration," was dated November 17, 1976, to November 29, 1976. This clearly indicated that his ailments occurred after January 1, 1975, the effectivity date of the New Labor Code. The Court reiterated its holdings in previous cases, such as Erese vs. Employees' Compensation Commission and Labenia vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, emphasizing that for the presumption of compensability to arise, the illness must have supervened during employment, and there must be competent evidence to show when the illness was contracted. The petitioner's claim that the ulcers were contracted before January 1, 1975, was considered mere conjecture, unsupported by evidence, as required by the ruling in Armeña vs. Employees' Compensation Commission. Therefore, the claim was governed by the provisions of the Labor Code, not the old law.
Main Doctrine
Under the Labor Code, for a sickness to be compensable, it must be an occupational disease listed in Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, or the claimant must prove that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Cancer of the pancreas is not an occupational disease, and the claimant failed to present evidence that the decedent's work as a bookkeeper or administrative assistant increased the risk of contracting it.