People v. Gregorio Pacada, Jr.

G.R. Nos. L-44444-45 · 1986-07-07 · J. MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: On September 9, 1974, at about 8:00 PM, Alfonsa Patnon was asleep in her house with her son Romeo and daughter-in-law Ofelia. The barking of dogs awakened Alfonsa, who saw two persons running towards their kitchen. Upon lighting a lamp, she was met by appellants Gregorio Pacada, Jr. and Avelino Pacada, who hacked her with bolos on the head and other parts of her body. As she lay on the floor, her son Romeo emerged from their room and was also hacked by the appellants until he fell. Ofelia, witnessing the assault, jumped out the window with her child and ran to her brother-in-law Nathaniel's house to report the incident. Nathaniel rushed to his mother's place and, through the window, saw the appellants hacking someone on the floor. He overheard someone say, 'Patayin na ninyo.' He also saw Gregorio Pacada, Sr. and Cesario Maur standing at the foot of the stairs. Nathaniel and his relatives returned later to find Alfonsa and Romeo critically wounded. Romeo died five minutes after arrival at the hospital. Alfonsa, treated for her wounds, would have died without emergency surgery and was hospitalized for two months. Prior to the incident, Alfonsa had filed a land case against Cesario Maur, an uncle of the appellants. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Oriental Mindoro convicted Gregorio Pacada, Jr. and Avelino Pacada of Murder and Frustrated Murder, sentencing them to death for the former and an indeterminate prison term for the latter. Gregorio Pacada, Sr. and Cesario Maur were acquitted. The Petition: Appellants Gregorio Pacada, Jr. and Avelino Pacada appealed their conviction, assigning errors concerning the trial court's belief of prosecution evidence, rejection of their alibi, finding them guilty, and imposing the death penalty.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in believing the prosecution's evidence, particularly the identification of the defendants-appellants. Whether the trial court erred in not believing the defense of alibi. Whether the trial court erred in finding the defendants-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and frustrated murder. Whether the trial court erred in sentencing the defendants-appellants to the supreme penalty of death, considering the qualifying and aggravating circumstances.

Ruling

The judgment under review is hereby MODIFIED in that (1) in Criminal Case No. P-639 for Murder, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua and the indemnity for the death of the victim increased to P30,000.00; and (2) in Criminal Case No. P-640 for Frustrated Murder, the penalty is reduced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Costs against appellants.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of identification and belief of prosecution evidence: The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's finding that the prosecution witnesses positively and satisfactorily identified the appellants as the perpetrators. The witnesses knew the appellants prior to the incident, negating any possibility of mistaken identity. Contradictions in testimony were addressed, and the principle that disbelief of a witness's testimony regarding one fact does not necessarily discredit the entire testimony was reiterated. On the defense of alibi: The Supreme Court held that the defense of alibi must fail when it is overturned by positive identification by prosecution witnesses who knew the accused for several years. The appellants' homes were near the crime scene, making their presence at the scene physically possible. Therefore, their alibi was not given credence against the strong positive identification by the victims and eyewitnesses. On the guilt of the appellants for Murder and Frustrated Murder: The Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly determined the guilt of the appellants for both crimes. The testimonies of witnesses who witnessed the assaults were deemed credible. The disclosure made by Romeo Patnon as a dying declaration corroborated the prosecution's case, negating the defense's claim of mere suspicion. On the qualifying and aggravating circumstances and the penalty: The Supreme Court agreed that treachery qualified the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder. Evident premeditation was not proven. The generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling was appreciated. Nocturnity was deemed inherent in treachery. For the crime of Murder, the penalty was commuted to reclusion perpetua due to lack of required votes for the death penalty, and indemnity was increased. For Frustrated Murder, the penalty was reduced as recommended by the Solicitor General.

Main Doctrine

The positive identification of the appellants by prosecution witnesses, who had known them for several years, overcomes the defense of alibi. Motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Treachery qualifies the crime to Murder and Frustrated Murder when the attack is sudden and unexpected, posing no risk to the assailants. Dwelling is a generic aggravating circumstance. The penalty for Murder, qualified by treachery and aggravated by dwelling, is reclusion perpetua due to lack of votes for the death penalty, with increased indemnity. The penalty for Frustrated Murder is reduced.

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