People v. Serante
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On April 9, 1975, at approximately 10:45 PM, three men, identified as Mamerto Serante, Loreto Ancheta, and Fernando Ancheta, entered the store of Lucena Alsaybar and her deceased husband, Anselmo Sicuan. They ordered cigarettes and coffee. Subsequently, Mamerto Serante drew a firearm and ordered everyone not to move. Loreto Ancheta, also armed, herded the family members into the sleeping quarters. Mamerto Serante took P20.00 in cash from a tin can. Thereafter, Mamerto Serante and Loreto Ancheta dragged Anselmo Sicuan out of the sleeping quarters. Barrio Captain Eugenio Tambalque, who was on patrol, approached the store after being informed by Anselmo Sicuan about "masasamang tao" (bad people) inside. Upon directing his flashlight at Mamerto Serante, who was holding a pistol, Tambalque was recognized. Serante fired, hitting Tambalque on the right forehead and right palm. Additional shots followed, fatally wounding Anselmo Sicuan, who was behind Tambalque. The accused then fled. Dr. Dolores Maglanoc's examination of Anselmo Sicuan revealed four gunshot wounds and an abrasion. Eugenio Tambalque was treated for a gunshot wound on his hand and a grazing wound on his forehead. Procedural History: The accused were charged with robbery with homicide and physical injuries. They pleaded not guilty. The trial court found Mamerto Serante, Loreto Ancheta, and Fernando Ancheta guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and physical injuries, imposing the death penalty due to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime and the absence of mitigating circumstances. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review. The Petition: The appellants contended that the prosecution failed to establish the elements of positive identification, conspiracy, nighttime, robbery, and homicide beyond reasonable doubt. They also argued that the trial court erred in considering nighttime as an aggravating circumstance and in disregarding their defense of alibi. Mamerto Serante also questioned the trial court's jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case. Whether the accused were positively identified as the perpetrators of the crime. Whether conspiracy was sufficiently established. Whether robbery was clearly established. Whether nighttime should be considered an aggravating circumstance. Whether the defense of alibi was properly disregarded.
Ruling
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the trial court. The accused Mamerto Serante, Loreto Ancheta, and Fernando Ancheta were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. They were ordered to pay jointly and severally P30,000.00 to the heirs of Anselmo Sicuan and P3,000.00 for funeral expenses.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction: The Supreme Court ruled that Mamerto Serante's contention that the case should have been tried by military courts due to martial law was without merit. The Court reiterated that as long as civil courts are open and functioning, military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over civilians. Furthermore, the question of jurisdiction was raised only after the adverse decision on the merits, which is too late to be considered. On positive identification: The Court found that the positive identification of the accused by the witnesses Lucita Sicuan, Lucena Alsaybar Sicuan, and Eugenio Tambalque was credible. Eugenio Tambalque recognized Mamerto Serante due to prior acquaintance, and the coffee shop was well-lighted. Lucita and Lucena Sicuan also recognized Mamerto Serante, having seen him previously working near their store. The Court found no irregularity in the identification procedure, distinguishing it from cases where identification was deemed unreliable. On conspiracy: The Court held that conspiracy was established by the concerted acts of the accused. Their arrival together, whispering, herding the family into quarters, Mamerto pointing a gun, Fernando positioning himself at the door, and the dragging of Anselmo Sicuan all indicated a common design and unity in execution. The Court reiterated that conspiracy may be inferred from the attendant circumstances and that the act of one conspirator is the act of all. On the existence of robbery: The Court affirmed that robbery was committed, as testified by the widow and daughter. The small amount of money taken and the fact that other valuables were not taken did not negate robbery, as the arrival of the barrio captain and the subsequent shooting likely interrupted the appellants' plans, causing them to flee abruptly. The Court noted that the absence of face coverings did not diminish the credibility of the robbery charge, as such acts can be committed with boldness. On nighttime as an aggravating circumstance: The Court agreed with the appellants that nighttime, per se, is not an aggravating circumstance. It was not sufficiently shown that the accused purposely sought nocturnity to facilitate the crime. The witnesses testified that the coffee shop was well-lighted by a Coleman lamp, enabling them to see and identify the perpetrators. On the defense of alibi: The Court found the defense of alibi unconvincing and not credible. It reiterated that alibi must be clearly established and show it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime. The Court noted that the travel time between Bongabon and Carranglan was not so prohibitive as to make the appellants' presence at the scene impossible, especially given the positive identification by prosecution witnesses. The documentary evidence presented to support the alibi was also found to be flawed.
Main Doctrine
Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design. The act of one conspirator becomes the act of all, and it is of no moment that not all the accused participated in the actual commission of every act constituting the crime. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, especially when the distance and travel time between the locus criminis and the alleged location of the accused do not preclude the possibility of their presence at the scene of the crime.