Republic of the Philippines v. Arro
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Republic of the Philippines, as petitioner, filed a complaint against respondents Isabelo I. Pacquing and Carmen B. Pacquing for the collection of deficiency taxes totaling P260,070.72 for the years 1956, 1957, and 1958. The respondents, represented by their counsel Atty. Vicente Garcia, initially filed an answer. The petitioner later amended the complaint to increase the claimed deficiency, which the respondents moved to dismiss. The respondent court denied this motion, and the respondents adopted their original answer. 2. Procedural History: Following a trial on the merits and the submission of memoranda, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered a decision on October 10, 1977, ordering the defendants to pay various taxes and surcharges. A copy of this decision was received by Atty. Garcia's clerk on December 19, 1977. As no appeal was filed within the reglementary 30-day period, which expired on January 18, 1978, the petitioner moved for execution of the judgment. Subsequently, on January 23, 1978, the private respondents, now represented by new counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with a motion for an extension to file the record on appeal. The petitioner opposed this, arguing the appeal period had lapsed. The trial court, in its Orders of March 9, 1978, and April 21, 1978, granted the extension, gave due course to the appeal, and denied the motion for execution, prompting the present petition. 3. The Petition: This case is a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition, and Injunction, filed by the Republic of the Philippines. The petitioner seeks to nullify the trial court's Orders of March 9, 1978, and April 21, 1978. The core issue presented to the Supreme Court is whether the negligence of a counsel who went abroad and effectively abandoned a case can bind his client. The petitioner argues that the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period due to the negligence of the private respondents' counsel and his clerk, and therefore, the decision should be considered final and executory.
Issue(s)
Whether the negligence of counsel who went abroad and practically abandoned a case can bind his client. Whether the trial court erred in giving due course to the appeal filed beyond the reglementary period.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The Orders of March 9, 1978, and April 21, 1978, of the Court of First Instance of Davao are set aside for being null and void. The decision of the trial court dated October 10, 1977, is declared final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the negligence of counsel can bind his client: The Court reiterated the established rule that when a party appears by attorney, all notices must be given to the attorney, not the client, and a notice to the client is not a notice in law. Furthermore, the client is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel. It is the duty of an attorney to arrange their affairs to promptly receive all judicial notices, and the negligence of a secretary is considered the negligence of the attorney. However, this rule has exceptions, such as when a lawyer totally forgets about a case and fails to inform the client, in which case the client should not be bound. In the present case, Atty. Vicente Garcia's counsel went to the United States but left a clerk in charge of his office. The clerk received the copy of the decision, but did nothing about it, causing the reglementary period for appeal to lapse. The Court found this to be inexcusable negligence, whether the clerk acted with or without instructions from Atty. Garcia. Therefore, the private respondents are bound by the negligence of their lawyer, and their appeal was not interposed within the reglementary period. On the issue of whether the trial court erred in giving due course to the appeal: The Court found that the trial court erred in giving due course to the appeal. Under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, an appeal must be taken by serving and filing a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment. This requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional. In this case, the notice of decision was received by the counsel's clerk on December 19, 1977. The 30-day period for appeal expired on January 18, 1978. The notice of appeal and motion for extension were filed on January 23, 1978, which was beyond the reglementary period. The trial court's act of giving due course to an appeal filed out of time, without any valid justification or excusable negligence on the part of the client or counsel, constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Therefore, the orders allowing the appeal and denying the motion for execution were null and void.
Main Doctrine
A client is bound by the negligence or failings of counsel, and the negligence of a counsel's clerk in failing to note down a trial date or process a notice of decision is considered inexcusable negligence of counsel, barring an appeal if the reglementary period has lapsed.