Can v. Galing
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An Information for Robbery was filed against Domingo Can, Emilio Daria, Sgt. Jesus Abion, and Francisco Lizard. All accused pleaded not guilty. Procedural History: The prosecuting fiscal moved to discharge Emilio Daria to be a state witness, citing specific grounds. Petitioner and another accused opposed the motion. The respondent Judge granted the discharge on May 12, 1980, and denied the motion for reconsideration on June 10, 1980. The Petition: Petitioner Domingo Can filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders of the respondent Judge discharging Emilio Daria. A temporary restraining order was issued by the Supreme Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the discharge of accused Emilio Daria to be a state witness was proper under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, considering the necessity of his testimony and the availability of other evidence. Whether the criteria for discharging an accused as a state witness were met, specifically concerning Daria's prior convictions involving moral turpitude.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The Orders of respondent Judge, dated 12 May 1980 and 10 June 1980, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The discharge of accused Emilio Daria from the information in Criminal Case No. 500 is annulled, and his reinstatement as one of the accused in the same information is ordered.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of discharging Emilio Daria as a state witness and the necessity of his testimony: The Supreme Court found that the discharge of Emilio Daria was improper as the respondent Judge failed to strictly adhere to the criteria outlined in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. The Court emphasized that the discharge of an accused to become a state witness is a matter that requires careful consideration of specific legal requirements to prevent abuse and ensure the integrity of the judicial process. The failure to meet even one of the enumerated conditions is sufficient ground to set aside the order of discharge. The Court's role is to ensure that such a significant procedural step is taken only when legally warranted. The Court held that there was no absolute necessity for the testimony of Emilio Daria, given Michael Yu's testimony and the prosecution's admission regarding other evidence. The prosecution had other avenues and evidence to pursue the case without solely relying on Daria's testimony. On the disqualification of Daria due to prior convictions involving moral turpitude: The records revealed that Emilio Daria had been convicted of several crimes, including attempted murder, carrying of deadly weapons, slander by deed, and slight physical injuries. The Court reiterated the definition of moral turpitude and concluded that attempted murder involves moral turpitude. The presence of these prior convictions, particularly for attempted murder, clearly disqualified Daria from being discharged as a state witness under the provisions of the Rules of Court, which explicitly require that the witness should not have been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Main Doctrine
The discharge of an accused to be a state witness requires strict adherence to the criteria set forth in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, including the absolute necessity of the testimony, the lack of other direct evidence, substantial corroboration, the accused not being the most guilty, and the absence of prior convictions involving moral turpitude. Failure to meet any of these criteria renders the discharge improper.