Miranda v. Ortiz
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Dominador R. Miranda leased a unit of his apartment to private respondent Charito Mallari in 1973 under an oral agreement with a monthly rental of P200.00, later increased to P242.00. No definite period for the lease was discussed or agreed upon. Procedural History: On May 31, 1979, Miranda notified Mallari to vacate the premises by September 1, 1979, due to the personal need of his married son and his family for a dwelling. When Mallari failed to vacate, Miranda filed an ejectment case. The City Court ruled against Miranda, holding that the verbal lease had not expired. The Court of First Instance affirmed this decision, acknowledging the lessor's need but finding the lease period indeterminate and thus not terminable by notice. The Petition: Miranda appealed to the Supreme Court on the sole issue of whether the verbal lease agreement had expired within the meaning of Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25.
Issue(s)
Whether a verbal lease of an apartment with monthly rentals, for which no definite period was agreed upon, can be legally terminated by notice at the end of any given month. Whether the lessor's personal need for the premises can be invoked as a ground for judicial eviction in a verbal lease of indefinite duration, and the applicability of Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 in such cases.
Ruling
The judgment of the Court a quo is reversed and set aside. Private respondent Charito Mallari and all persons claiming under her are ordered to vacate the leased premises immediately, to pay rentals at the rate of P242.00 per month from January 1982 until they vacate, and to pay petitioner P2,000.00 for attorney's fees and costs. The judgment is immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of lease termination: The Supreme Court held that a verbal lease agreement for an indefinite period, with monthly rental payments, is considered a lease from month to month under Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The Court clarified that Section 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 suspends Article 1673 of the Civil Code, not Article 1687. Therefore, the determination of the lease period can still be made in accordance with Article 1687. In this case, since the rent was paid monthly, the lease is deemed to be from month to month. Consequently, the lessor could terminate the lease by giving notice to vacate at the end of any given month. On the issue of the lessor's need and the applicability of Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25: The Court emphasized that to rule otherwise would render Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 illusory in cases of verbal leases for indefinite periods, as lessors would be unable to eject tenants despite their pressing need for the premises. The Court cited previous rulings in Rivera v. Florendo, Baens v. Court of Appeals, and Zablan v. CA. to support its position that the lessor's need, coupled with proper notice, is a valid ground for ejectment in month-to-month leases.
Main Doctrine
A verbal lease agreement for an indefinite period, with monthly rental payments, is considered a month-to-month lease terminable at the end of any month, even if the ground for ejectment is the personal need of the lessor's family, as provided under Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25. Section 6 of BP 25 suspends Article 1673 of the Civil Code, not Article 1687, thus allowing for the determination of lease periods under Article 1687.