People v. Carlo Lagrana y Mañibo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On 3 December 1981 the incident in question occurred in Dao, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, in which the Victim subsequently died on 6 December 1981. The autopsy findings disclosed the cause of death as "shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage secondary to skull fracture secondary to head trauma." Two eyewitnesses placed the accused at the scene contemporaneously with the incident. The following day the accused were summoned by police authorities and were initially released; one accused was later arrested in 1983 and tried separately. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court, Oriental Mindoro (Calapan), Branch 39, convicted the accused Carlo Lagrana as principal and Frangeline Salazar as accomplice of Murder with the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The Trial Court sentenced Lagrana to reclusion perpetua and ordered indemnity to the heirs. Salazar was sentenced under the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Lagrana appealed only as to the non-application of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance and sought reduction of penalties and indemnity. The Petition: In the present appeal to the Supreme Court (First Division), the accused-appellant Carlo Lagrana does not question his conviction or the characterization of the crime, but assigns as error the Trial Court's refusal to treat his conduct as voluntary surrender thereby denying the mitigation he claimed.
Issue(s)
Whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to consider voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Whether the evidence on record proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to accused Carlo Lagrana.
Ruling
The judgment of the Regional Trial Court is affirmed. The Court held that the evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the crime was attended by treachery. The Supreme Court modified only the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, ordering accused Carlo Lagrana to indemnify the heirs in the amount of P20,000.00 with costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the Trial Court erred in refusing to consider voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance: The Court found that the appearances of the accused before police authorities the day after the incident did not amount to voluntary surrender. The Trial Court's factual finding was that the accused did not evince an intent to submit unconditionally; indeed, accused Carlo Lagrana asserted self-defense when interrogated and Salazar made no statement. Applying the requisites for voluntary surrender as stated in People v. Regales, 6 SCRA 830, the Court reiterated that "A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either (1) because he acknowledges his guilt, or (2) because lie wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture." Because these requisites were not satisfied, voluntary surrender could not be characterized as a mitigating circumstance. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Trial Court's refusal to give mitigating weight to the accused's conduct. On Whether the evidence on record proves the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt: The Court held that the guilt of Carlo Lagrana was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The decision emphasized the testimony of two credible prosecution eyewitnesses who identified the accused as the principal actor and observed him at the scene contemporaneous with the incident. The accused's plea of self-defense was uncorroborated and therefore insufficient to overcome the direct and positive identifications by eyewitnesses. The autopsy report corroborated that the death resulted from severe intracranial hemorrhage and skull fracture consistent with the occurrence of the crime, supporting the causal link between the incident and the Victim's death. On this record the Court found no reason to disturb the Trial Court's credibility determinations and affirmed the conviction. On Whether the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery: The Court agreed with the Trial Court that treachery attended the commission of the crime. The reasoning was that the method of the commission demonstrated that the accused acted in a manner which gave no opportunity for the Victim to defend himself, thereby fitting the established conception of treachery. This factual finding supported the imposition of the enhanced penalty appropriate to Murder attended by treachery. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the Trial Court's characterization of the qualifying circumstance and the consequent penalty classification. On Whether the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to accused Carlo Lagrana: The Court noted the Trial Court's determination that the Indeterminate Sentence Law was not applicable to Carlo Lagrana "considering the penalty imposable on him." The Supreme Court affirmed that determination. Given the penalty imposed on Lagrana by reason of the crime and its qualifying circumstance, the Court found that the applicable sentencing regime did not admit the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to his case. Accordingly, the Trial Court's ruling on non-applicability of that law to Lagrana was left undisturbed.
Main Doctrine
Voluntary surrender qualifies as a mitigating circumstance only when it is spontaneous and shows the accused's intent to submit unconditionally to the authorities; mere reporting or appearance for inquiry is not voluntary surrender.