Heirs of Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Maria Marron filed Civil Case No. 97479 against Felicisimo Bazar and Fe S. Bazar to compel them to execute a registrable Deed of Absolute Sale over a residential lot (Lot No. 2-A) covered by T.C.T. No. 100612. While this case was pending, Maria Marron caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on T.C.T. No. 100612 on January 27, 1976. A judgment was rendered in favor of Marron on February 24, 1976, ordering the execution of the deed of sale. The judgment became final and executory. The Bazaars refused to comply, leading to a court order for the Clerk of Court to execute the deed of sale in their behalf. Meanwhile, Fe S. Bazar executed a deed of absolute sale of the same lot in favor of Maria Marasigan on December 18, 1974, for P15,000.00. This deed was registered on July 5, 1977, resulting in the cancellation of T.C.T. No. 100612 and the issuance of a new title, T.C.T. No. 126056, in Maria Marasigan's name. Crucially, the notice of lis pendens annotated by Marron was carried over to Marasigan's new title. Procedural History: The Bazaars filed a petition for relief from judgment on May 26, 1977, and later moved to set aside the judgment on June 22, 1979, alleging lack of jurisdiction. Marron filed L.R.C. Case No. 7680 to have Marasigan's title cancelled, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the land registration court, with prejudice to filing in a court of general jurisdiction. Marron then filed Civil Case No. 126378 to cancel Marasigan's TCT 126056. This case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch IV, on February 18, 1982, as premature because the judgment in Civil Case No. 97479 was still subject to a petition for relief. On appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that Marron was entitled to the property due to the notice of lis pendens and that the judgment in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and executory because the Bazaars' petition for relief was filed out of time. The IAC ordered the cancellation of Marasigan's title and the issuance of a new one in Marron's name. The Petition: The heirs of Maria Marasigan (who died during the proceedings) filed the present petition before the Supreme Court, assigning several errors to the IAC's decision, including failure to apprehend prescription and laches, abandonment of rights, incorrect conclusion on the finality of the judgment, lack of jurisdiction in subsequent cases, and the validity of the deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in concluding that the decision in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and executory. Whether Maria Marasigan, as a subsequent purchaser, was bound by the notice of lis pendens annotated on the title. Whether the petition for relief from judgment filed by the Bazaars was filed within the reglementary periods. Whether the issues of prescription, laches, and lack of jurisdiction could be raised in the present petition; and the validity of the deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the finality of the judgment in Civil Case No. 97479: The Supreme Court affirmed the IAC's finding that the decision dated February 24, 1976, in Civil Case No. 97479 had become final and executory. The Bazaars' transferors did not appeal within the 30-day period. The 60-day period for filing a petition for relief from judgment, reckoned from May 12, 1976 (when they were served notice), expired on July 11, 1976. The Bazaars filed their petition on May 26, 1977, which was 379 days later, clearly beyond the 60-day period. Furthermore, even if the 6-month period from the entry of judgment (which became final on June 11, 1976) were considered, the petition filed on May 26, 1977, was also filed out of time, as the 6-month period would have lapsed on January 8, 1977. Thus, the Bazaars could not render the final judgment abortive. On the effect of the notice of lis pendens: The Court reiterated that a notice of lis pendens serves as constructive notice to the whole world that a property is involved in litigation. Any subsequent purchaser buys the property at their own risk. Maria Marasigan acquired the property on December 18, 1974, but her deed of sale was registered only on July 5, 1977. This registration was subsequent to the annotation of the notice of lis pendens by Maria Marron on January 27, 1976. Therefore, Marasigan was bound by the outcome of the litigation between Marron and the Bazaars. The Registrar of Deeds correctly carried over the notice of lis pendens to Marasigan's title (T.C.T. No. 126056), as this is a duty to prevent prejudice to innocent third parties. On the timeliness of the petition for relief: As detailed above, the petition for relief from judgment filed by the Bazaars was unequivocally filed out of time, violating both the 60-day period from knowledge of the judgment and the 6-month period from the entry of the judgment. This procedural defect rendered the judgment in Civil Case No. 97479 final and executory, precluding any further challenge on its merits or jurisdiction. On raising issues of prescription, laches, and jurisdiction; and the validity of the deed of sale: The Court held that the petitioners (heirs of Marasigan) could not raise issues of prescription, laches, and lack of jurisdiction over the persons of the Bazar spouses in Civil Case No. 97479 before the Supreme Court in this instance. These issues should have been raised by the Bazaars themselves as defenses in their motion to dismiss or answer in the original case. By failing to do so, these defenses were deemed waived. The present petition originated from Civil Case No. 126378, and these issues were not properly ventilated therein. The Court affirmed the validity of the deed of sale executed by the Deputy Clerk of Court on behalf of the Bazar spouses, as it was done pursuant to a court's judgment that had become final and executory. This action was a necessary consequence of the Bazaars' refusal to comply with the court's order, and it served to give effect to the final judgment.
Main Doctrine
A notice of lis pendens annotated on a title serves as constructive notice to the whole world, and any subsequent purchaser or transferee, even if they obtain a new title, is bound by the outcome of the litigation. Registration of a deed of sale is the act that creates constructive notice to third persons, and if this registration occurs after the annotation of lis pendens, the subsequent purchaser is bound by the results of the litigation.