Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In 1859, three brothers, Benedicto, Jose, and Manuel Pansacola, agreed to purchase the Island of Cagbalite. They agreed it would be common property, with Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors represented by Manuel, included in the co-ownership. In 1868, they modified the agreement, specifying a new sharing and distribution of the island: Benedicto (1/4), Jose (1/4), children of deceased Eustaquio (1/4), and nephews/nieces including Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo (1/4), all under the care of Manuel. In 1907 and 1908, agreements were made by representatives of the heirs regarding the partition of the island, including plans for surveying and demarcation. Procedural History: In 1968, private respondents filed an action for partition. Petitioners raised defenses of prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel, and laches. The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that the island had already been partitioned. The Intermediate Appellate Court reversed this decision, declaring the parties co-owners subject to a four-part division and ordering the cancellation of titles and a final partition. The IAC denied motions for reconsideration. The Petition: Petitioners sought review of the IAC's decision and resolution, arguing that the island was already partitioned and that prior Supreme Court decisions barred the action.
Issue(s)
Whether Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of the original co-owners. Whether the action for partition is barred by prescription, res judicata, or laches.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, declaring Cagbalite Island as still undivided property and remanding the case for final partition.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common: The Court held that despite agreements for distribution and partition plans in 1859, 1868, 1907, and 1908, there was no actual physical partition of the Island. The agreements merely outlined sharing proportions and distribution schemes, but until physical division is effected, each co-owner's share remains an ideal share. The Court noted that the agreements of 1907 and 1908 contemplated future surveys and plans, and testimony indicated these contracts were never implemented due to unpaid expenses. Therefore, the co-ownership has not been terminated by physical partition. On whether the action for partition is barred by prescription, res judicata, or laches: The Court ruled that an action for partition does not prescribe, citing Article 400 of the Old Civil Code (now Article 494), which implies imprescriptibility. It clarified that prescription cannot run in favor of a co-owner against others unless there is a clear repudiation of co-ownership communicated to them. The Court distinguished the prior ruling in G.R. Nos. 21033-35, stating that the 'partition' mentioned therein was in an 'ideal, abstract and spiritual sense,' not a technical physical partition. The mere possession and enjoyment of portions by some co-owners, without a judicial decree or conformity of all, does not constitute repudiation of co-ownership. Thus, the defenses of prescription and laches were rejected.
Main Doctrine
An action for partition does not prescribe and can only be barred by the repudiation of co-ownership. Mere possession and enjoyment of portions of the property by some co-owners do not constitute repudiation or termination of co-ownership without a judicial decree or conformity of all co-owners.