Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the probate of the alleged last will and testament of the deceased Nemesio Acain. The petitioner, Constantino Acain, claims to be an instituted heir and seeks to have the will probated and letters testamentary issued to him. The will, written in Bisaya with an English translation, purports to distribute Nemesio Acain's share of joint properties with his wife, Rosa Diongson, to his brother Segundo Acain, or Segundo's children if Segundo predeceased Nemesio. Segundo Acain did predecease Nemesio, making his children, including the petitioner, potential beneficiaries. However, the deceased's widow, Rosa Diongson, and his legally adopted daughter, Virginia A. Fernandez, were not mentioned in the will, raising the issue of preterition. 2. Procedural History: Constantino Acain filed a petition for probate in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Oppositors, Virginia A. Fernandez and Rosa Diongson, filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the petitioner lacked legal capacity, was merely a universal heir, and that they had been preterited. The trial court denied this motion. Subsequently, the oppositors filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court, which was referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The IAC granted the petition, ordering the trial court to dismiss the probate proceedings. After the denial of his motion for reconsideration by the IAC, the petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: This case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to overturn the decision of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner argues that the IAC erred in several respects: (A) the petition for certiorari and prohibition was not the proper remedy; (B) probate courts are limited to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of a will and cannot pass upon its intrinsic validity before probate; (C) the will is valid and the respondents were not preterited as they are not compulsory heirs in the direct line; (D) the testator's intent should be paramount; (E) the petitioner has legal standing as an instituted heir; and (F) Article 854 of the Civil Code is unconstitutional. The core of the petitioner's argument is that the IAC should not have considered the intrinsic validity of the will, particularly the issue of preterition, at the procedural stage it did.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition was the proper remedy. Whether the authority of a probate court is strictly limited to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of a will. Whether the widow and the legally adopted daughter were pretirited under Article 854 of the Civil Code. Whether the petitioner has the legal standing to file the petition for probate. Whether the will is valid and should be admitted to probate.
Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals ordering the dismissal of the probate proceedings is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of certiorari and prohibition: The Court affirmed that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in not dismissing a case where dismissal is founded on valid grounds. The remedies are available when appeal would not afford speedy and adequate relief, especially when the grounds for dismissal are indubitable. In this case, the IAC correctly found that the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss based on preterition, which rendered the will intrinsically void. On the scope of probate court authority: While the general rule limits a probate court's authority to the extrinsic validity of a will, this rule is not inflexible. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is empowered to pass upon certain provisions of the will, particularly its intrinsic validity, to avoid multiplicity of suits and protracted litigation. The Court cited precedents like Nuguid v. Nuguid and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals where the Supreme Court itself passed upon the intrinsic validity of wills to achieve practical considerations and judicial economy. On preterition of the widow and adopted daughter: The Court held that the legally adopted daughter, Virginia A. Fernandez, was clearly pretirited as she was omitted from the will and not expressly disinherited, despite being granted the same rights as a legitimate child under PD 603. While the widow, Rosa Diongson, is a compulsory heir, Article 854 of the Civil Code specifically refers to compulsory heirs in the direct line. However, the preterition of the adopted daughter, who is in the direct line, was sufficient to annul the institution of heirs. Both were deprived of at least their legitime. On the petitioner's legal standing: The Court ruled that petitioner Constantino Acain lacked legal standing to file the petition for probate. As the institution of heirs was annulled due to preterition, leading to total intestacy, the petitioner was effectively not an heir of the testator. His interest as a universal heir was nullified by the preterition of compulsory heirs, and he was neither an appointed executor nor a devisee or legatee. On the validity and probate of the will: The universal institution of petitioner and his siblings to the entire inheritance, coupled with the preterition of the adopted daughter, resulted in the annulment of the institution of heirs. According to Article 854 of the Civil Code, preterition annuls the institution of heirs, throwing open the entire inheritance to intestate succession. Since no legacies or devises were provided in the will, the entire property was left by universal title, and its annulment led to total intestacy. Therefore, the will, on its face, was intrinsically void and should not have been admitted to probate.
Main Doctrine
Preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line annuls the institution of heirs, leading to intestacy, unless there are valid legacies or devises. The probate court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of a will if circumstances demand it, even before extrinsic validity is resolved, to avoid multiplicity of suits.