Victiorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Victorias Milling Co., Inc. (petitioner) was required by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) to have its tugboats and barges undergo harbor formalities and pay entrance/clearance and berthing fees. Additionally, PPA demanded that petitioner secure a permit for cargo handling operations at its private Da-an Banua wharf and remit 10% of its gross income from these operations as the government's share. Petitioner contended that it was exempt from these fees and charges, asserting that it had built, maintained, and dredged the wharf and its associated channel at its own expense, without any government contribution. Petitioner also argued that the wharf was primarily used for handling sugar purchased from district planters for its milling operations. 2. Procedural History: Following PPA's denial of its request for reconsideration, petitioner sought to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The CTA dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and recommended that the appeal be directed to the Office of the President. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Office of the President, which was dismissed on July 27, 1984, solely on the grounds that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioner's prior attempt to appeal to this Court (G.R. No. 66381) was denied. 3. The Petition: This petition for review on certiorari challenges the July 27, 1984 decision of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs. The sole legal issue presented is whether the 30-day period for appeal under Section 131 of PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77 was tolled by the pendency of the petitions filed first with the Court of Tax Appeals and subsequently with this Court. Petitioner argues that its good-faith pursuit of appeals through the CTA and this Court should have tolled the appeal period to the Office of the President, given the perceived ambiguity in appellate jurisdiction following the creation of PPA. The petition also questions the basis for PPA's assessment of dues and charges and the requirement to remit 10% of handling charges.
Issue(s)
Whether the 30-day period for appeal under Section 131 of PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77 was tolled by the pendency of petitions filed with the Court of Tax Appeals and the Supreme Court. Whether there is a legal basis for PPA to assess and impose dues and charges on petitioner's private wharf and operations.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs denying the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of tolling the reglementary period: The Court held that the petitioner's contention that the recourse to the Court of Tax Appeals and then to the Supreme Court tolled the period to appeal is untenable. While petitioner claimed to be guided by good faith and the assumption that procedural rules of appeal then enforced still held true, the Court emphasized that the right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly in accordance with law. Presidential Decree No. 857 empowers the PPA to promulgate rules and regulations, including those governing appeals. PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77, enacted pursuant to this power, has the force and effect of law and is binding on all persons dealing with the PPA. The Court found no basis for the claim that Section 131 of Administrative Order No. 13-77 only provides for appeal when the decision is adverse to the government, as the provision clearly allows any party aggrieved by the decision of the General Manager, as affirmed by the PPA Board, to appeal to the Office of the President within thirty (30) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Furthermore, the Court noted that the PPA Administrative Order No. 13-77 was duly published in the "The Times Journal" on November 9, 1977, dispelling any claim of ignorance. The petitioner's failure to appeal on time stemmed from its own negligence, not from a purported ignorance of proper procedural steps. On the issue of the legal basis for PPA's assessment of dues and charges: The Court found that the fees and charges collected by PPA are not for the use of the wharf itself, but for the privilege of navigating in public waters, entering and leaving public harbors, and berthing on public streams or waters. Citing Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Actg. Commissioner of Customs, the Court reiterated that berthing charges are collectible regardless of whether mooring is made from a private pier or wharf, as the government maintains navigable waters and supports its operations through such impositions. Regarding the 10% remittance of handling charges, Section 6B-(ix) of Presidential Decree No. 857 authorizes PPA to levy dues, rates, or charges for the use of its facilities or services. This 10% share is considered contractual compensation agreed upon as a condition for the grant of a permit to operate arrastre and stevedoring services. Therefore, the PPA's assessment and imposition of dues and charges were legally justified.
Main Doctrine
The right to appeal is a statutory privilege that must be exercised strictly in accordance with law. Failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period, even if guided by good faith, results in the dismissal of the appeal.