House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-75287 · 1987-06-30 · J. CORTES, J.: · Primary: Civil; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and sale of the House International Building. The property was initially owned by Atty. Felipe Ang, who mortgaged it to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). After foreclosure and Ang's failure to redeem, GSIS became the owner and subsequently sold it to Centertown Marketing Corporation (CENTERTOWN) via a deed of conditional sale. CENTERTOWN, not authorized for real estate business, organized Manila Towers Development Corporation (TOWERS) with similar incorporators. CENTERTOWN then assigned its rights and obligations under the sale to TOWERS, with GSIS's consent. Procedural History: The House International Building Tenants Association, Inc. (ASSOCIATION) filed a complaint against GSIS, CENTERTOWN, and TOWERS, seeking to annul the deed of conditional sale and the subsequent assignment. The ASSOCIATION argued that the sale was ultra vires as CENTERTOWN lacked the corporate authority for such a transaction. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, and its decision was affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) on February 4, 1986. A motion for reconsideration was denied on June 26, 1986. The Petition: The ASSOCIATION filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The primary issues raised are whether the ASSOCIATION has the legal standing to sue on behalf of its members and whether it has a valid cause of action against the respondents. The petition argues that the conditional sale is void ab initio due to being ultra vires and contrary to public policy, citing constitutional provisions and Presidential Decree No. 1517. The petitioner also relies on a previous Supreme Court ruling regarding tenants' rights to purchase leased land.

Issue(s)

Whether the petitioner ASSOCIATION has the personality to sue in its own name as a corporation representing its members. Whether the petitioner ASSOCIATION has a cause of action against respondents GSIS, CENTERTOWN, and TOWERS, and whether the Deed of Conditional Sale between GSIS and CENTERTOWN is void ab initio for being ultra vires.

Ruling

The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

Ratio Decidendi

On the personality to sue: The Court affirmed the CA's finding that the petitioner ASSOCIATION lacks the personality to sue. Citing Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment. The ASSOCIATION failed to show any real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action, as the alleged rights violated were personal and individual to its members, the tenants. The ASSOCIATION has a personality separate and distinct from its members, and it cannot sue on behalf of them without demonstrating its own direct interest in the controversy. The benefits of the suit were intended for the unnamed members, not for the corporation itself. On the cause of action and the validity of the contract: The Court agreed with the CA that the petitioner has no cause of action to assail the validity of the deed of conditional sale and the subsequent assignment. Article 1397 of the Civil Code provides that the action for annulment of contracts may be instituted only by those who are principally or subsidiarily obliged. The petitioner is neither a party nor a privy to the Deed of Conditional Sale and the assignment thereof. Therefore, it cannot maintain an action to annul these contracts. The petitioner's assertion that the contract is void ab initio for being ultra vires was also rejected. The Court clarified that an ultra vires contract is merely voidable, not void, and can only be assailed by the parties to the contract or their privies, or in cases of corporate acts, by the corporation itself or its stockholders. The constitutional provisions and Presidential Decree No. 1517 cited by the petitioner were found to be inapposite to the case, as they did not render the contract unlawful or void. The ruling in Santos vs. Court of Appeals was reiterated, emphasizing that P.D. 1517 does not apply when both the land and the building belong to the lessor.

Main Doctrine

A corporate entity, having a personality separate and distinct from its members, cannot sue on behalf of its members unless it demonstrates a real, actual, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action. Furthermore, a party who is neither a party nor a privy to a contract cannot assail its validity, as the action for annulment may only be instituted by those who are principally or subsidiarily obliged thereby.

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