Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
NEW DOCTRINEFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. (petitioner) challenged Department Order No. 37, issued by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports (respondent). This order authorized private schools to increase tuition and other school fees by 10% to 15% for the school year 1987-1988. The petitioner argued that these increases were excessive and lacked legal basis, and that the order was issued in violation of due process. 2. Procedural History: Following the issuance of an initial order by the DECS allowing a 15% to 20% increase, the petitioner sought reconsideration. The DECS subsequently issued Department Order No. 37, reducing the allowable increase to 10% to 15%. Despite this reduction, the petitioner continued to oppose the increases and, after failing to obtain a response from the Office of the President regarding a telegram urging suspension, filed an original Petition for prohibition with the Supreme Court. 3. The Petition: The petitioner filed an original Petition for prohibition, arguing that Department Order No. 37 was unconstitutional. The core arguments were that the DECS lacked the legal authority to increase school fees, as the power to regulate does not inherently include the power to increase, and that the order was issued in violation of the due process clause because the petitioner was not afforded prior notice and hearing. The petitioner sought a declaration that the Department Order was unconstitutional.
Issue(s)
Whether the DECS has the power to increase school fees. Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 37 violated the due process clause by not affording prior notice and hearing to students and parents.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Department Order No. 37 is declared constitutional.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of DECS's power to increase school fees: The Court held that Section 57(3) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982) vests the DECS with the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the administration, supervision, and regulation of the educational system. This power, in the absence of any statute to the contrary, includes the power to prescribe school fees. Since no other government agency is vested with this authority, it is lodged with the DECS to enable it to effectively discharge its functions. Section 70 of the same Act further grants the DECS the authority to issue necessary implementing rules and regulations. On the issue of due process violation: The Court disagreed with the petitioner's contention that prior notice and hearing are indispensable for the validity of Department Order No. 37. The Court distinguished between legislative and adjudicative functions of administrative agencies. Prescribing rates that apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, such as the maximum school fees for all private schools, is considered a legislative function, which does not require prior notice and hearing as a requirement of due process. The Court found that Department Order No. 37 was issued in the exercise of DECS's legislative function. Furthermore, the Court noted that the petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence of arbitrariness, especially since the DECS had already reduced the initially proposed increase upon petitioner's instance. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was not successfully disputed by the petitioner.
Main Doctrine
The power of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) to regulate the educational system includes the power to prescribe school fees. The issuance of department orders setting maximum school fees for all private schools is a legislative function, not requiring prior notice and hearing for validity, unless clear and convincing evidence of arbitrariness is shown.