Tumbagahan v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute involved two cases filed by petitioner Ramon Tumbagahan with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte. The first case, Civil Case No. 1257, sought a declaration of ownership and reconveyance of specific lots. The second case, Cadastral Case No. IL-N-4, aimed to review a decree of registration and cancel titles issued to Timotea Lasmarias for the same lots. 2. Procedural History: During a joint trial on April 10, 1968, petitioner relieved his counsel, Atty. Melvyn Salise, whose withdrawal was approved. On April 15, 1968, petitioner appeared personally and moved for postponement, which was denied. The court then dismissed both cases. A copy of the dismissal order was sent to Atty. Jose Amarga, who received it on April 26, 1968, while petitioner received his copy on May 17, 1968. After a motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal, which the trial court dismissed as untimely, counting the appeal period from Atty. Amarga's receipt of the order. 3. The Petition: This petition for review on certiorari assails the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's mandamus petition. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision, finding that Atty. Amarga remained petitioner's counsel of record even after Atty. Salise's withdrawal. Consequently, service of the dismissal order on Atty. Amarga on April 26, 1968, legally commenced the reglementary period for appeal, rendering petitioner's subsequent filing out of time. Petitioner argued he had terminated Atty. Amarga's services and that service should only count from his personal receipt of the order.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner validly terminated the services of his counsels of record, Atty. Melvyn Salise and Atty. Jose Amarga, such that service on them of processes and notices would no longer bind him. Whether the receipt by Atty. Amarga of the trial court's order of dismissal would start the running of the period within which the petitioner should file his appeal.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether Atty. Amarga was counsel of record and service upon him was binding: The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that Atty. Amarga was indeed one of the counsels for the petitioner. This was evidenced by pleadings filed with the trial court bearing the names of both Atty. Salise and Atty. Amarga, and specifically, an answer to a counterclaim signed by Atty. Jose B. Amarga. The Court emphasized that the attorney-client relationship does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal made of record. The petitioner's termination of Atty. Salise's services did not automatically sever the relationship with Atty. Amarga, as no formal withdrawal of Atty. Amarga was made of record. Furthermore, the Court noted that the motion for postponement filed by Tumbagahan on April 15, 1968, was lengthy and raised legal points indicative of legal assistance, contradicting his claim of not having counsel. The Court reiterated the mandatory rule that where a party is represented by counsel, service of notices must be made upon counsel and not upon the party personally, as such service is sufficient and binding upon the party. On the issue of when the reglementary period to appeal commenced: Applying the rule on service of process upon counsel, the Supreme Court held that service of the order of dismissal was legally effected upon the petitioner on April 26, 1968, the date Atty. Amarga, his remaining counsel of record, received the copy. The Court cited numerous precedents establishing that notice given to a party personally is not notice in law when they are represented by counsel. Therefore, the petitioner's appeal, filed after the period calculated from April 26, 1968, was correctly dismissed by the Court of Appeals as being out of time. The Court stressed that unless properly relieved, a counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case, and the attorney-client relation continues until the end of the litigation from the perspective of the opposing party.
Main Doctrine
Service of notices and processes upon a counsel of record is binding upon the client, and the reglementary period to appeal commences from the date of such service, even if the client personally receives a copy of the order later.