Del Carmen v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case concerns the intestate estate of the deceased Agustin N. Medina. The core dispute revolves around the sale of a property known as "Bitucang Manok" within the estate proceedings. The probate court initially issued an order approving the sale of this property to one of the heirs, petitioner Rosalia M. del Carmen, on January 29, 1969. 2. Procedural History: Following the order approving the sale, private respondents received a copy on February 6, 1969. They filed an urgent manifestation on February 15, 1969, seeking to suspend the order's implementation and to examine accounting records. On March 27, 1969, respondent Uldarico Medina amplified this motion, specifically praying for the order granting the sale to be set aside. The probate court, on March 6, 1970, issued an order confirming the sale, addressing the objections raised by the private respondents. After receiving this confirmation order on April 8, 1970, the private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. They then filed a second motion for reconsideration, termed a "Petition For Reception of Evidence," which was also denied. Subsequently, on August 13, 1970, they filed their Notices of Appeal. The case reached the Court of Appeals, where the petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was filed out of time. The Court of Appeals denied this motion, leading to the present petition. 3. The Petition: The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the motion to dismiss the appeal. The petitioner contends that the private respondents' appeal was filed out of time, as their initial motion to set aside the sale was filed beyond the prescribed period, and their subsequent second motion for reconsideration was pro-forma, thus not tolling the period for appeal. The petitioner asserts that the appeal should have been filed by August 9, 1970, making the August 13, 1970 filing untimely. The core issue before the Supreme Court is whether the private respondents' appeal was perfected within the reglementary period.
Issue(s)
Whether the appeal of the private respondents was filed out of time. Whether the second motion for reconsideration filed by the private respondents was pro-forma and thus did not toll the reglementary period for appeal.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The questioned resolutions of the Court of Appeals are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents' appeal is ordered DISMISSED. This decision is FINAL and IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY and no motion for reconsideration will be entertained.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the appeal was filed out of time: The Court held that the appeal was indeed filed out of time. The petitioner contended that the private respondents moved to set aside the order approving the sale on March 27, 1969, which was beyond the 30-day period from their receipt of the order on February 6, 1969. Even if the period were reckoned from the receipt of the order confirming the sale on April 8, 1970, the notice of appeal filed on August 13, 1970, was still late because the second motion for reconsideration was pro-forma and did not toll the period. The reglementary period to appeal should have ended on August 9, 1970. On the issue of whether the second motion for reconsideration was pro-forma: The Court agreed with the petitioner that the second motion for reconsideration was pro-forma. The private respondents argued that it contained a new ground not previously passed upon, specifically their filing of a bond to suspend the sale. However, the Court found that the propriety of filing such a bond had already been passed upon by the probate court in its order dated March 6, 1970. Therefore, the additional ground had no merit and had already been considered, rendering the motion pro-forma. A pro-forma motion for reconsideration does not toll the running of the period for appeal, as established in numerous Supreme Court rulings. The Court emphasized that perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to do so renders the decision final and executory, depriving the appellate court of jurisdiction. The Court characterized the respondents' actions as dilatory tactics to prevent the order of confirmation of sale from becoming final and executory, especially since the property had already been paid for by the petitioner.
Main Doctrine
A pro-forma motion for reconsideration does not toll the reglementary period for filing an appeal, and failure to perfect an appeal within the statutory period results in the judgment becoming final and executory, divesting the appellate court of jurisdiction.