Andres de la Merced v. Teodoro de Guzman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff-appellant Andres de la Merced was the agricultural lessee of a three-hectare riceland owned by defendant-appellee Teodoro de Guzman. On June 22, 1970, the landowner offered to sell the cultivated portion to De la Merced, giving him 90 days to exercise the option. De la Merced received the offer on July 3, 1970, and expressed his intent to buy with the assistance of the Land Authority and Land Bank. A conference to agree on the price failed. Procedural History: On September 17, 1970, De la Merced, joined by the Land Authority and Land Bank as co-plaintiffs, filed a complaint for pre-emption in the Court of Agrarian Relations. The landowner filed a motion to dismiss, which the lower court granted on March 31, 1971, citing failure to allege tender and consignation of the price within the 90-day period and that the filing of the complaint did not interrupt the period. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, which referred the case to the Supreme Court due to purely legal questions. The Petition: The case was elevated to the Supreme Court, which required the parties to inform it whether De la Merced was still in possession of the land and if the case had become moot and academic. Several counsels were noted as deceased or no longer at their given addresses. One counsel manifested that he never acted as counsel for any party.
Issue(s)
Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for pre-emption under Republic Act No. 3844. Whether the filing of the complaint for pre-emption interrupted the 90-day period for exercising the right.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the complaint, finding no error in the dismissal. The costs were assessed against the appellant Andres De la Merced.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the complaint sufficiently alleged a cause of action for pre-emption under Republic Act No. 3844: The Court held that the complaint was fatally defective for lack of a cause of action. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3844 requires the agricultural lessee to exercise the right of pre-emption within 90 days from written notice by the owner. The complaint failed to allege that De la Merced had tendered and consigned the reasonable price of the landholding within this prescribed period. It only stated that the Land Authority and Land Bank were willing to provide legal and financial assistance and to deposit the amount deemed reasonable by the court. This willingness alone does not constitute a tender or consignation of payment, which is a mandatory requirement to establish a cause of action for pre-emption. The Court reiterated that a complaint must state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and in this case, the failure to allege the tender or deposit of the price within the statutory period rendered it fatally defective, citing Falcasantos vs. How Suy Ching. On Whether the filing of the complaint for pre-emption interrupted the 90-day period for exercising the right: The Court ruled that there is no legal provision that suspends or interrupts the 90-day period for exercising the lessee's right of pre-emption. The right of pre-emption, like redemption, is not a matter of mere intent but requires the proper payment or tender of the price within the specified period. The Court emphasized that how the pre-emptioner raises the money is immaterial; what matters is the timeliness of the payment or tender. The filing of a complaint without the requisite tender or consignation does not interrupt the period. The Court cited Basbas vs. Enteria to support the principle that pre-emption requires actual payment or tender, not just an expression of willingness to finance the acquisition. The Court further clarified that Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3844 does not grant special consideration to the Land Authority or Land Bank as pre-emptioners on behalf of the agricultural lessee. The 90-day limitation period applies equally to all pre-emptioners, and the law makes no distinction, hence the Court should not either, citing Isabel Velasco vs. Francisco Lopez.
Main Doctrine
The agricultural lessee's right of pre-emption under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 3844 must be exercised by tendering or consigning the purchase price within the 90-day period from written notice by the landowner; mere expression of willingness to assist financially or to deposit a reasonable price is insufficient.