Tan v. City of Davao
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case concerns a 1,966-square-meter lot in Davao City registered in the name of Dominga Garcia. Dominga Garcia, along with her husband and three children, including petitioner Vicente Tan's mother, emigrated to China in 1923 and never returned. Dominga Garcia died intestate in China in 1955. The property remained unclaimed in the Philippines for decades. Ramon Pizarro, a nephew of Dominga's adoptive mother, Cornelia Pizarro, occupied a portion of the land and collected rentals, initiating a dispute over its ownership and disposition. 2. Procedural History: The City of Davao filed a petition for escheat of Dominga Garcia's land on September 12, 1962, in the Court of First Instance of Davao, alleging that Dominga and her heirs were presumed dead and that the property should revert to the city. The petition was published as required. Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition, leading to numerous delays and appeals to higher courts regarding various interlocutory orders. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of the City of Davao on March 23, 1972, ordering the land to escheat to the city and Pizarro to account for rentals. Pizarro appealed to the Court of Appeals, and after his death, Luis Tan, claiming to be Dominga's son, sought intervention, which was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on April 2, 1976. 3. The Petition: Vicenta Tan, and/or her attorney-in-fact Ramon Pizarro, filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, challenging the Court of Appeals' decision. The petition raised two main arguments: (1) that the City of Davao lacked the legal personality to file the escheat petition, and (2) that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan could be presumed dead. The Supreme Court denied the petition, finding no reversible error in the appellate court's decision, and affirmed the applicability of the 1940 Rules of Court regarding the filing of escheat petitions by municipalities or cities, and upheld the presumption of death as an incident of escheat proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether the City of Davao had the legal personality to file the petition for escheat. Whether Vicenta Tan, as an alleged heir, could be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings. Whether Ramon Pizarro had the legal personality to oppose the escheat petition.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review for lack of merit, affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals. The land and rentals were ordered to escheat to the City of Davao. Ramon Pizarro was ordered to render an accounting of income collected and deliver the owner's duplicate title to the City of Davao.
Ratio Decidendi
On the City of Davao's legal personality to file the escheat petition: The Court held that under Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which was applicable at the time the petition was filed on September 12, 1962, a municipality or city where the deceased last resided or had estate could file an escheat petition. This rule explicitly granted such personality to the city, unlike the later Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court (effective January 1, 1964) which limited such petitions to the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General. Applying the 1940 Rules was deemed necessary to avoid injustice to the City of Davao, consistent with the saving clause of Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Therefore, the City of Davao was correctly recognized as having the personality to initiate the escheat proceedings. On the presumption of death of Vicenta Tan: The Court affirmed the ruling that Dominga Garcia and her heirs could be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings. While a petition solely for a declaration of presumptive death is not entertained, such a declaration can be made as an incident of proceedings for the settlement of an absentee's intestate estate. The Court cited In re Szatraw (81 Phil 461) for the principle that the presumption of death may arise and be invoked in a competent court's proceedings. Article 390 of the New Civil Code provides for the presumption of death after seven years of absence for general purposes and ten years for succession purposes. The Court found that the City of Davao sufficiently proved the facts giving rise to the presumption, namely, the departure of Dominga Garcia and her family for China in 1923 and their continuous absence and lack of contact for approximately 39 years until the petition was filed, with no known heir appearing to claim the estate. On Ramon Pizarro's legal personality to oppose the escheat petition: The Court found that Ramon Pizarro was not a real party in interest and thus lacked the personality to oppose the escheat petition. The records indicated that Vicenta Tan was never formally made a party to the proceedings, and an order to substitute her for Pizarro as oppositor was set aside. Furthermore, Vicenta Tan was never served with summons extra-territorially, nor did she appear in the trial court herself or through counsel, thereby never submitting to the court's jurisdiction. Consequently, Pizarro, as an alleged administrator without proper legal standing in the case, could not validly oppose the petition on behalf of an unrepresented or unsummoned party.
Main Doctrine
A municipality or city may file an escheat petition under Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court, and the presumption of death of an absentee may be declared as an incident of proceedings for the settlement of the absentee's estate, provided that the absentee has been absent for the period prescribed by law and there is no known heir.