Cabresos v. Tiro
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents filed a case against spouses Galicano and Florentina Cabresos for recovery of ownership and possession of a portion of a residential-commercial parcel of land, alleging illegal occupation since February 24, 1961. The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the private respondents, ordering the defendants to vacate the land, pay monthly rentals, and declaring their house built in bad faith. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. Procedural History: A writ of execution was issued. Petitioners, who are the wife and children of Rodolfo Cabresos (son of the original defendants), refused to vacate a second building constructed on the premises during the pendency of the litigation. They claimed their house was not part of the litigated property and they were not parties to the original case. An alias writ of execution was issued, and petitioners filed a separate case for quieting of title and injunction. The respondent judge dismissed the contempt and demolition motions based on a written promise by petitioner Virgilia Cabresos to remove their house. Subsequently, the judge dismissed Civil Case No. 5539 based on this promise. The Petition: Petitioners filed the present petition seeking a restraining order, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the respondent judge in the execution proceedings, specifically citing a variance between the decision and the writ of execution, and the impending demolition of their house. They invoked Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court regarding third-party claims.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners, as alleged third parties and privies to the original defendants, are bound by the writ of execution. Whether there is a variance between the judgment and the writ of execution that would render the latter void. Whether the petitioners' voluntary acquiescence in the execution of the judgment bars them from assailing it.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The restraining order previously issued is dissolved. The decision is immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of petitioners being bound by the writ of execution: The Court held that the petitioners are considered "privies" to the original case, as they are the daughter-in-law and grandchildren of the losing party. The term "privies" refers to those between whom an action is deemed binding even if not literally parties. Therefore, the assailed decision is binding on the petitioners, including the order to vacate. The house they constructed during the litigation, initially a "camarin" and later converted into a dwelling, falls within the scope of the judgment. On the issue of variance between the judgment and the writ of execution: The Court found the contention of variance to be untenable. While the petitioners' house was not the exact structure referred to in the original judgment, the order to vacate extends to privies. The Court reiterated the rule that a writ of execution cannot differ from or exceed the terms of the judgment. However, in this case, the judgment accords recovery of ownership and possession, and this recovery would be rendered meaningless if ejected tenants could continuously build new structures. The inclusion of the second house in the writ was deemed consistent with the overall objective of the judgment to grant full recovery to the private respondents. On the issue of voluntary acquiescence: The Court emphasized that the petitioners, through Virgilia Cabresos, voluntarily acquiesced to the execution of the judgment. This was evidenced by a written promise dated August 12, 1977, to remove their house within thirty days, and her subsequent agreement to dismiss Civil Case No. 5539. The Court cited the doctrine that a party who voluntarily executes or acquiesces in the execution of a judgment is not permitted to appeal from it. The claim that the promise was made without counsel was belied by the record, and any subsequent repudiation was deemed insignificant in the absence of fraud or duress at the time of execution. Voluntary acquiescence effectively ends legal processes.
Main Doctrine
A writ of execution must conform to the terms of the judgment; however, the order to vacate premises extends to privies of the parties, and voluntary acquiescence in the execution of a judgment bars a party from assailing it.