People v. Cayago
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The accused Martin Cayago, Ricardo Macaraeg, and Juan Capitle were charged with multiple rape in an information alleging that on November 18, 1974, they conspired and, with force and intimidation, using a gun, bolo, and a piece of wood, had sexual intercourse, one after another, with Nancy Mamaril, a 17-year-old virgin, against her will. The offended party suffered moral, exemplary, and actual damages. Procedural History: Appellant Martin Cayago was arrested and pleaded not guilty. His co-accused remained at large. The trial court found appellant Cayago guilty of three (3) distinct offenses of rape and imposed three (3) death penalties, with damages. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review. The Petition: Appellant Cayago assails the trial court's decision, citing alleged inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, the medico-legal evidence regarding healed lacerations, lack of motive for inclusion in the charge, disregard of defense witnesses, failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and failure to apply P.D. 603 for being a minor at the time of the offense.
Issue(s)
Whether the inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony affect her credibility. Whether the medico-legal finding of old healed lacerations of the hymen negates the charge of rape against a virgin complainant. Whether the complainant had a motive to fabricate the charge against the appellant. Whether the defense of alibi presented by the appellant is sufficient to overcome the positive identification by the complainant. Whether the appellant can be held liable as a principal for three (3) counts of rape despite his co-accused not having been arraigned or tried. Whether Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) should have been applied to the appellant as a minor.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Martin Cayago for three (3) counts of rape but modified the penalty from three (3) death penalties to three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua, in view of the constitutional abolition of the death penalty. The award of damages was affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the credibility of the complainant and inconsistencies in her testimony: The Court held that the alleged inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony referred to minor details or the precise sequence of events that did not detract from the central fact of rape. These discrepancies were attributed to the natural fickleness of memory, the trauma of the assault, and the length and tedium of the cross-examination. The Court reiterated that when the issue is credibility, the findings of the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor, are accorded great respect. The Court found no compelling reason to deviate from the trial court's assessment. On the medico-legal evidence of healed hymenal lacerations: The Court found the defense's reliance on the medico-legal finding of "old healed lacerations of the hymen" to be unpersuasive. The examining physician did not state that these lacerations were necessarily older than ten days or could not have been inflicted on the date of the alleged rape. The Court emphasized that the probative value of medico-legal evidence must be assessed in light of all other evidence, and conviction for rape can be had even without a positive medical report if other evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On the motive of the complainant: The Court rejected the defense's theory that the complainant fabricated the story due to adolescent disappointment or a desire to include the appellant in the charge. The Court found it difficult to believe that a "simple barrio girl" would weave such a story and endure the embarrassment of a public trial for mere adolescent disappointment. The records did not show any motive other than a desire for justice for a terrible wrong. On the defense of alibi: The Court found the appellant's alibi to be weak and insufficient to overcome the positive identification by the complainant. The alibi required the accused to be at a place other than the situs of the crime and to show impossibility of presence at the crime scene. In this case, the wedding where the appellant claimed to be was only fifty meters away from the scene of the crime, making it physically possible for him to have been present. Furthermore, the alibi was supported only by the appellant and his father, not by independent witnesses. On liability for multiple rapes despite co-accused not being tried: The Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the appellant could be held liable as a principal for three (3) counts of rape. Invoking the doctrine in People v. Villa and People v. Alfaro, the Court held that when several accused conspire and take turns in committing rape, each is guilty of as many crimes of rape as there are accused, as each cooperates in the consummation of the acts of the others. The Court clarified that this doctrine applies even if only one accused is tried and convicted, as the conviction is based on the factual finding of conspiracy and participation, and does not bind the unapprehended co-accused. On the application of P.D. 603: The Court dismissed the appellant's argument that P.D. 603 should have been applied because he was a minor. The Court held that this defense was raised for the first time on appeal and was therefore too late to be considered.
Main Doctrine
Where several accused, conspiring with each other, take turns in having carnal knowledge of the offended party against her will while the others held down her arms and legs, each of the accused is guilty of as many crimes of rape as there are accused. Each accused is responsible not only for the act of rape committed personally by him but also for the acts of rape committed by the others, because each of them cooperated in the consummation of the rape successively committed by the others, by acts without which such rape could not have been accomplished. They are at once, in other words, each a principal by direct participation in respect of their own act and a principal by indispensable cooperation in respect of the acts of the others; they are not merely accomplices of each other.