People v. Maravilla
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Remy G. Gomboc, a saleslady, alleged that on April 29, 1977, Manuel B. Gadon, an attorney, grabbed her left breast against her will, causing her shock, indignation, and shame. Procedural History: On May 10, 1977, Gomboc filed a complaint for acts of lasciviousness against Gadon. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the municipal mayor due to the absence of the judge. A warrant of arrest was issued, and Gadon posted bail. On July 1, 1977, the municipal judge dismissed the case, annulling the preliminary investigation and warrant of arrest for the mayor's failure to ask "searching questions." On July 13, 1977, the complainant re-filed the charge of acts of lasciviousness. On July 19, 1977, the respondent judge found no prima facie showing of acts of lasciviousness and ordered the prosecution to file the proper charge. On July 21, 1977, a complaint for unjust vexation was filed. Gadon pleaded not guilty and moved to quash on the ground of prescription. The respondent judge granted the motion and dismissed the case on October 11, 1977, denying reconsideration on November 9, 1977. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, challenged the dismissal orders, contending that the crime had not prescribed.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a complaint for acts of lasciviousness interrupts the prescriptive period for unjust vexation. Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal mayor, in the absence of the municipal judge, validly suspends the prescriptive period.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED. The challenged orders of the respondent judge are SET ASIDE. The records of this case are remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the filing of a complaint for acts of lasciviousness interrupts the prescriptive period for unjust vexation: The Court held that the prescriptive period for unjust vexation was interrupted. It reasoned that what controls is not the designation of the offense but its description in the complaint. The complainant's description of the act, which included being grabbed by the breast against her will, sufficiently constituted unjust vexation, even if it was initially denominated as acts of lasciviousness. The Court cited numerous cases holding that a misnomer or innocuous designation of a crime in the caption will not vitiate the charge if the facts set forth in the body of the complaint sufficiently constitute an offense. Therefore, even though the initial complaint was for acts of lasciviousness, the facts described therein were sufficient to apprise the accused of the charge of unjust vexation, thereby interrupting the prescriptive period for the latter. The Court further noted that unjust vexation is a lesser offense embraced by acts of lasciviousness, and conviction or acquittal of either should bar prosecution for the other under the rule on double jeopardy. On the issue of whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal mayor validly suspends the prescriptive period: The Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor, who was authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation in the absence of the municipal judge under Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period. The Court cited People vs. Olartes and People vs. Galano, which held that the filing of a complaint in the Municipal Court, even if only for preliminary examination or investigation, interrupts the period of prescription. The Court emphasized that Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code does not distinguish between a complaint filed for preliminary examination and one filed for action on the merits. The actuation of the court, even if only for investigation, represents the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, and it would be unjust to deprive the injured party of vindication due to delays not under their control. The Court clarified that the period of prescription began to run from April 29, 1977, was interrupted after 11 days by the filing of the first complaint on May 10, 1977, resumed running upon dismissal on July 1, 1977, was suspended again after 12 days by the re-filing on July 13, 1977, resumed running upon dismissal on July 19, 1977, and was finally interrupted by the filing of the unjust vexation complaint on July 21, 1977. In total, the prescriptive period had run for only 25 days, which is well within the 60-day period for unjust vexation.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a complaint for acts of lasciviousness, even if the facts described therein constitute unjust vexation, interrupts the prescriptive period for unjust vexation. Furthermore, the filing of a complaint with the municipal mayor, acting as an investigator in the absence of the judge, is a valid act that suspends the prescriptive period.