Ganzon v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Gelacio E. Tumambing contracted Mauro B. Ganzon, a common carrier, to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from Mariveles, Bataan, to Manila via the lighter LCT "Batman." On December 1, 1956, delivery commenced, and about half the scrap iron was loaded when Mayor Jose Advincula demanded P5,000.00 from Tumambing. After Tumambing resisted, the Mayor shot him. Subsequently, on December 4, 1956, Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, with policemen, ordered the captain of the lighter, Filomeno Niza, to dump the scrap iron into the sea. The rest was taken to the NASSCO compound, and the Municipality of Mariveles issued a receipt for the custody of the scrap iron. Procedural History: Gelacio E. Tumambing filed an action for damages based on culpa contractual against Mauro B. Ganzon. The Court of First Instance of Manila ruled in favor of Ganzon. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, ordering Ganzon to pay actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The Petition: Mauro B. Ganzon filed a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals' decision, arguing that he was not guilty of breach of contract, that he was not liable for the acts of his employees in dumping the scrap iron as ordered by local officials, and that the loss was due to a fortuitous event.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner was guilty of breach of the contract of transportation and liable from the time the scrap iron was placed in his custody and control. Whether the petitioner is liable for the acts of his employees in dumping the scrap iron into the sea, based on an order issued by local government officials. Whether the loss of the scrap iron was due to a fortuitous event, exempting the petitioner from liability.
Ruling
The petition is denied, and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The petitioner is liable for damages.
Ratio Decidendi
On the petitioner's liability for breach of contract and custody: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that the petitioner was guilty of breach of contract. The delivery of the scrap iron to Captain Filomeno Niza, the petitioner's employee and captain of the lighter, constituted unconditional delivery to the common carrier. Upon receipt of the goods for transportation, the contract of carriage was perfected, and the petitioner's extraordinary responsibility commenced. This responsibility ceases only upon actual or constructive delivery to the consignee. The fact that part of the shipment was not yet loaded on board did not negate the contract, as the goods remained under the carrier's custody and control. On the petitioner's liability for the acts of his employees and the order of local officials: The Court held that the petitioner was liable for the acts of his employees. The petitioner's defense that the loss was due to an "order or act of competent public authority" was rejected. The Court found that the Acting Mayor's order to dump the scrap iron was not shown to be lawful or issued under proper authority. Furthermore, the scrap iron did not belong to the Municipality. The Court emphasized that the order was part of a shakedown attempt and did not constitute valid authority for the carrier to carry out. The petitioner was not duty-bound to obey an illegal order, and the mere difficulty in fulfilling the obligation does not constitute force majeure. The scraps could have been unloaded elsewhere, and the dispute settled later. On the loss being due to a fortuitous event: The Court rejected the petitioner's claim of fortuitous event. Article 1734 of the Civil Code enumerates specific causes that exempt a common carrier from liability, such as natural disaster, act of public enemy, act or omission of the shipper, character of the goods, or order of competent public authority. The petitioner failed to prove that the loss fell under any of these exceptions. Consequently, Article 1735 of the Civil Code presumes the carrier to be at fault or negligent. The petitioner did not demonstrate that he exercised extraordinary diligence or that the loss was due to an unforeseen event or force majeure. The Court also noted the petitioner's shift in theory from "act of competent public authority" to "caso fortuito" on appeal, which is generally not allowed.
Main Doctrine
A common carrier's extraordinary responsibility for the loss or destruction of goods commences upon their receipt for transportation and ceases only upon actual or constructive delivery to the consignee. The carrier is presumed negligent if the loss is not due to any of the causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code, and cannot be exempted from liability by claiming fortuitous event or act of public authority if the order was illegal or if the carrier failed to prove extraordinary diligence or the impossibility of fulfilling the obligation.