Donato v. Luna
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Leonilo C. Donato contracted a marriage with Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Subsequently, on September 26, 1978, Donato entered into a second marriage with Paz B. Abayan. This second marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, as both parties executed a joint affidavit under Article 76 of the New Civil Code, asserting they had lived together as husband and wife for over five years. Abayan later discovered Donato's prior subsisting marriage and separated from him in November 1978. Procedural History: On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila filed an information for bigamy against Donato. On September 28, 1979, Abayan filed a civil action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Donato, alleging her consent was obtained through deceit. In the civil case, Donato argued that the second marriage was void for lack of a license and that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. Donato then moved to suspend the criminal bigamy proceedings, claiming the civil case posed a prejudicial question. The respondent judge denied the motion and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. The Petition: Donato filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. He contended that the resolution of the civil case for annulment is a logical antecedent to the bigamy charge. He specifically argued that the ruling in De la Cruz v. Ejercito (a later case) should be applied to grant the suspension, rather than the Landicho v. Relova doctrine cited by the trial court.
Issue(s)
Whether the pending civil case for annulment of the second marriage constitutes a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The orders of the respondent judge are sustained.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the requisites of a prejudicial question were not present in this case. A prejudicial question must be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action. The Court, applying Landicho v. Relova, clarified that an annulment case only suspends a bigamy trial if the accused's consent to the second marriage was vitiated by force or intimidation, making the act involuntary. In this instance, it was the second wife, Abayan, who filed for annulment based on Donato's deceit, which does not exculpate Donato from the criminal charge of bigamy. The Court noted that Donato's claim of duress was belied by the fact that he had lived with Abayan for years and voluntarily executed an affidavit to dispense with a marriage license. Furthermore, the Court reiterated the principle that parties cannot judge the nullity of their marriage for themselves; until a court declares a marriage void, it is presumed to exist. Finally, the Court distinguished De la Cruz v. Ejercito, noting that in that case, the accused herself filed for annulment on the ground of duress and a judgment of nullity had already been rendered, whereas no such judgment existed for Donato.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court held that for a civil action for annulment of marriage to be considered a prejudicial question to a bigamy case, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to the second marriage was obtained by means of duress, force, and intimidation. This is necessary to establish that the act of contracting the second marriage was involuntary and cannot be the basis for conviction. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that parties cannot unilaterally judge the nullity of their own marriage; a judicial declaration is required. Consequently, one who contracts a second marriage before the first is judicially declared null assumes the risk of prosecution for bigamy.