Caniza v. People
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An Information was filed on March 20, 1974, charging petitioner Silvestre Cañiza with falsification of public documents allegedly committed on November 5, 1968. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, which was granted, and the case was dismissed on November 27, 1974. The Fiscal's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on April 3, 1975. Procedural History: On June 13, 1979, a second Information was filed, charging petitioner with substantially the same offense. Petitioner again moved to quash, raising issues of prescription, prior dismissal on the merits, and insufficiency of allegations. The respondent judge denied the motion to quash and the motion to confiscate bond on November 27, 1979, and subsequently denied the Motion for Reconsideration on March 20, 1980. The Petition: Petitioner filed a Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with the Supreme Court, assailing the orders denying his motion to quash, raising issues of prescription, double jeopardy, and sufficiency of the second information.
Issue(s)
Whether the offense charged has already prescribed. Whether the filing of the second Information placed the accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense a second time. Whether the allegations in the second Information constitute an offense.
Ruling
The Petition is dismissed. The orders dated November 27, 1979, and March 20, 1980, are affirmed. The case is remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The crime of falsification of public documents by a private individual prescribes in ten (10) years under Article 90 in relation to Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states that the period of prescription commences from the discovery of the crime and is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information, resuming when such proceedings terminate without conviction or acquittal. The Court calculated that nine (9) years, six (6) months, and twenty-eight (28) days had elapsed between the commission of the offense and the filing of the second Information, which is within the ten-year prescriptive period. Even if the Fiscal's motion for reconsideration did not toll the period, the total time consumed, including the period of dismissal and denial of reconsideration, still fell within the ten-year limit, amounting to nine (9) years, eleven (11) months, and five (5) days. On the issue of double jeopardy: For double jeopardy to apply, several requisites must be met, including a valid charge, competent court, plea to the charge, conviction or acquittal, or dismissal without the accused's express consent, and the second offense being the same as the first. In this case, the first Information was dismissed upon the Motion to Quash filed by the petitioner himself, on grounds of insufficiency of the allegations. Such dismissal, being sought by the defendant and not on the merits, does not constitute an acquittal and amounts to a waiver of the right against double jeopardy. The petitioner is deemed to have waived his right to assert double jeopardy by moving to quash the first Information. On the sufficiency of the second Information: The Court agreed with the respondent judge that the second Information, as worded, was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction for the crime alleged. The petitioner's contentions to the contrary were deemed matters best raised and determined at the trial of the case.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a motion for reconsideration by the prosecution, even if it does not toll the prescriptive period, when added to the time the case was pending before the court, still falls within the ten-year prescriptive period for falsification of public documents. Furthermore, a dismissal of a criminal case based on a motion to quash filed by the accused on grounds of insufficiency of the information does not constitute double jeopardy as it is not an acquittal on the merits and the accused is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy.