People v. Abad
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Prior to March 27, 1978, Felix de Castro was issued a commercial lease permit by the Director of Mines for the quarrying of sand and gravel from the Sumigar Quarry in Banawe, Ifugao. Subsequently, an Information was filed charging private respondents with "Theft of Minerals" under Section 78 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1385. The Information alleged that the accused, conspiring and with evident premeditation and intent of gain, unlawfully extracted, removed, took, and disposed of minerals (sand, gravel, stones, boulders) from the Sumigar Quarry without the knowledge or consent of the permittee and without their own permit. They allegedly used force, threat, and intimidation against the permittee and his laborers, and disposed of the extracted minerals through contracts with government agencies and a private corporation, causing prejudice to the permittee. Procedural History: The respondents-accused filed a Motion to Quash, arguing that the facts charged did not constitute an offense because they had paid "sand and gravel tax" as evidenced by official receipts, implying government consent. They also invoked Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 243, which permits extraction for government infrastructure projects. The petitioner opposed, stating that municipal taxes are distinct from Bureau of Mines permits and that LOI 243, as implemented, applies only to government entities for infrastructure, not private persons. The respondent Judge quashed the Information, ruling that violation of PD 463 is an administrative offense and that the crime of Theft under the Revised Penal Code was not committed due to lack of malice. The motion for reconsideration was denied. The Petition: The People of the Philippines, through the Provincial Fiscal, filed a certiorari Petition with the Supreme Court, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge in quashing the Information.
Issue(s)
Whether the facts charged in the Information constitute the offense of "Theft of Minerals" under Section 78 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended. Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information, considering matters of defense extrinsic to the allegations, the nature of taxes paid, and the applicability of LOI No. 243.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, annulled and set aside the Orders of the respondent Judge dated January 28, 1980, and July 18, 1980, and ordered the reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 316 for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the facts charged constitute the offense of "Theft of Minerals" under Section 78 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended: The Court held that the sufficiency of an Information, when challenged on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, hinges on whether the alleged facts, if hypothetically admitted, meet the essential elements of the offense as defined by law. The Information alleged that the accused (1) extracted, removed, and/or disposed of minerals or material aggregates; (2) these minerals belonged to the Government or were taken from a mining claim leased to another person (Felix de Castro); and (3) the accused lacked the required mining lease or permit. These elements are explicitly provided in Section 78 of P.D. No. 463, as amended by Section 23 of P.D. No. 1385. Therefore, based on the allegations in the Information, the essential requisites of the offense were present. On the issue of whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the Information, considering matters of defense extrinsic to the allegations, the nature of taxes paid, and the applicability of LOI No. 243: The Court found that the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion by considering matters of defense extrinsic to the allegations in the Information, such as the official receipts for sand and gravel taxes. These matters should be substantiated during the trial, not at the stage of a motion to quash. The Court clarified that the taxes paid to the Municipal Treasurer pursuant to Provincial Ordinance No. 14 are not the permits required by the Bureau of Mines under P.D. No. 463 for the extraction, removal, and disposal of minerals. The receipts were insufficient to prove that the proper government office had granted the required permit. Furthermore, the respondent Judge's rationalization that the taking was without malice because taxes were paid was deemed incorrect for crimes punished by special laws, where the act itself, irrespective of motive, constitutes the offense. The Court reiterated that the consent of the government, as implied by the Judge, was not established by the mere payment of municipal taxes, which are distinct from the regulatory permits issued by the Bureau of Mines. The Court also noted that LOI No. 243, as implemented by Mines Administrative Order No. MRD-16 Series of 1977, grants the right to extract sand and gravel only to government entities for infrastructure projects, not to private persons or entities. Therefore, the invocation of LOI 243 by the private respondents was misplaced, as they were private individuals seeking to extract minerals for commercial purposes through contracts with government agencies and a private corporation, not for direct use in government infrastructure projects by a government entity.
Main Doctrine
The quashing of an information based on facts extrinsic to the allegations therein, such as payment of taxes, constitutes grave abuse of discretion, as such defenses should be substantiated during trial. Furthermore, payment of sand and gravel taxes does not equate to the required permit for mineral extraction under PD 463.