Tan v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from an ejectment complaint filed by petitioner Francisco Tan against private respondent Lorenza Dongsall. During a scheduled trial, Dongsall appeared without counsel and requested a resetting. The court suggested a settlement, leading to a compromise agreement where Dongsall agreed to pay rental arrears of P2,020.00 and attorney's fees of P800.00. The accrued rentals were paid, but Dongsall later alleged fraud and jurisdictional grounds in the execution of the compromise agreement. 2. Procedural History: After the compromise agreement was submitted to and accepted by the city court, and the accrued rentals were paid, Dongsall sought to amend the agreement when the attorney's fees were due. Subsequently, she filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and set aside the execution of judgment, alleging fraud. Despite not being notified of the denial of her motion, she received an order of execution. She then filed a petition for relief from judgment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which was given due course after the petitioner's motion to dismiss was denied. The RTC's denial of the motion to dismiss was subsequently challenged via a petition for certiorari before the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), which was also denied. 3. The Petition: The petitioner, Francisco Tan, seeks review of the IAC's decision. The petition raises four main arguments: (1) the IAC decision was invalid as it was rendered by a division of only three members, contrary to BP 129; (2) the petition for relief from judgment should not have been allowed due to a lack of valid cause of action; (3) the petition for certiorari should not have been dismissed, even if the order was interlocutory, due to alleged grave abuse of discretion by the trial court; and (4) an ordinary appeal was not the proper remedy. The petitioner also argues that the petition for relief was tardily filed, though this was not raised in the lower courts.
Issue(s)
Whether the challenged decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is invalid because it was rendered by a division of only three members. Whether the petition for relief from judgment should have been allowed despite the absence of a valid cause of action. Whether the petition for certiorari should have been dismissed even if the order appealed from was interlocutory, considering the alleged grave abuse of discretion by the trial court. Whether an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy.
Ruling
The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of the IAC decision: The Court held that BP 129 clearly provides that three members shall constitute a quorum for the sessions of a division of the Intermediate Appellate Court and the affirmative vote of three members is necessary for a decision. Since the required quorum of three was present and all three members concurred, the proceedings were in accordance with law. On the allowance of the petition for relief: The Court stated that the petition for relief clearly alleged that Dongsal, unassisted by counsel, was inveigled into signing the compromise agreement, which falls under fraud and mistake as grounds for relief under Rule 38. The existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It is for the trial court to initially determine if the grounds invoked justify the relief sought, subject to appellate review. The elaborate discussion of these grounds in the Supreme Court was unnecessary. On the dismissal of the petition for certiorari: The Court affirmed that the denial of the motion to dismiss the petition for relief was an interlocutory order. A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary writ and cannot be used as a substitute for an ordinary appeal. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be proved or shown prima facie to justify deviating from the regular procedure, which was not established in this case. Therefore, errors committed during the hearing of the petition for relief may only be raised by ordinary appeal. On the propriety of the remedy: The Court noted that the argument regarding the tardiness of the petition for relief was not raised in the motion to dismiss or in the respondent court, and thus, the alleged defense was deemed waived and could not be considered by the Supreme Court.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari cannot be used to circumvent the rule that interlocutory orders are not appealable, and the allegation of grave abuse of discretion must be proven or shown prima facie to justify such a remedy.