Jacinto v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Sancho R. Jacinto (substituted by his heirs) and Domingo Bascara filed a forcible entry and detainer case against respondents Pilar T. del Rosario and Mariano del Rosario. The parties entered into a compromise agreement, approved by the Court of First Instance (CFI) on March 17, 1971. The agreement stipulated that defendants would pay P100,000.00 plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees on installment. Section 2 of the agreement provided for immediate execution of the original award (P117,936.54 plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees with 8% interest) in case of default in any installment. Procedural History: Petitioners filed a motion for execution in 1972, which was granted. However, respondents entered into a new agreement to continue paying installments, stalling enforcement. When respondents again defaulted, petitioners sought an alias writ of execution, granted on January 2, 1973, for a balance of P85,180.12. A Sheriff's Return indicated partial satisfaction. On September 20, 1980, petitioners filed a motion for a second alias writ of execution, stating a balance of P35,472.45 as of August 10, 1979, with no further payments made despite reminders. The CFI denied this motion, and a subsequent motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the motion was filed beyond the five-year period for execution by motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) affirmed the CFI's decision. The Petition: Petitioners contend that the five-year period was suspended by their agreement with the respondents to defer enforcement of the writ of execution, citing Romana Torralba v. Hon. Walfrido de los Angeles.
Issue(s)
Whether the motion for a second alias writ of execution filed on September 20, 1980, was filed within the five (5) year period provided for the execution of judgment by mere motion, considering the terms of the compromise agreement and the conduct of the parties. Whether the parties' agreement to defer enforcement of the writ of execution suspended the running of the five-year prescriptive period, and the implications of such agreement on the enforcement of the judgment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court. It ordered the proper Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to issue an alias writ of execution to enforce the judgment.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the motion for a second alias writ of execution was filed within the five (5) year period: The Court found that while generally, a judgment based on a compromise is immediately executory, the specific terms of Section 2 of the compromise agreement (the acceleration clause) were not immediately executory but dependent on the occurrence of default. The prescriptive period for enforcing this section does not commence unless the activating factor of default occurs. The Court noted that previous defaults became immaterial when petitioners compassionately allowed respondents to resume installment payments. The delay in execution, lasting over eight years, was beneficial to the respondents. For reasons of equity, the Court treated the motion for execution as having been filed within the reglementary period, with the counting of the period commencing only after August 10, 1979, when respondents allegedly stopped paying installments. The time during which execution is stayed should be excluded, and the time will be extended by any delay occasioned by the debtor, as held in Blouse Potenciano v. Mariano. On whether the parties' agreement to defer enforcement suspended the running of the five-year prescriptive period: The Court held that the delay in the execution of the judgment, which lasted for more than eight (8) years, was beneficial to the private respondents. The petitioners, through their compassion and agreement to allow respondents to continue paying by installments, effectively suspended the enforcement of the writ. This suspension, granted upon the request and for the benefit of the respondents, meant that the five-year prescriptive period should commence only after the respondents' final cessation of payments. The Court reiterated that the statute of limitations is not designed against those who wish to act but cannot do so for causes beyond their control, citing Lancita, et al. v. Magbanua.
Main Doctrine
The five-year period for execution by motion under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is suspended when the delay in execution is occasioned by the debtor's pleas and entreaties for a chance to continue paying by installments, and the creditor compassionately allows such arrangement, especially when such delay is beneficial to the debtor. In such cases, equity may compel the court to treat the motion for execution as filed within the reglementary period.