Sy v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns conflicting claims of ownership over approximately eight hectares of land in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, valued at over P50 million. Henry Munar Chan applied for land registration, and a decision approving his application was rendered on February 21, 1974. Subsequently, decrees of registration and original certificates of title were issued to Chan and his assignees. Teoville Development Corporation (Teoville) later filed a complaint for quieting of title, alleging ownership of parcels within the same area, covered by its own transfer certificates of title derived from an earlier registration in 1919. Teoville sought to nullify the titles issued to Chan and his assignees due to overlapping boundaries. 2. Procedural History: The cases were consolidated and tried jointly. On November 25, 1982, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6966-P (Teoville vs. Chan and Sy Family) upholding Teoville's better right and declaring null and void the decrees and titles issued to Chan and his assignees. On November 29, 1982, a separate decision in Civil Case No. 9055-P (Phil. Machinery vs. Teoville) dismissed Phil. Machinery's complaint and also declared certain titles null and void. Copies of these decisions were sent to the counsel for the losing parties, Atty. Nemesio Diaz, at his recorded address, but were returned unclaimed. Teoville filed ex-parte motions for execution, arguing that the judgments had become final due to the counsel's failure to file a formal change of address. The trial court granted these motions. Atty. Diaz filed motions questioning the orders, asserting he had not received the decisions and that the court had actual knowledge of his new address. These motions were denied. Consequently, petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus were filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). 3. The Petition: The consolidated petitions before the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-66741 and G.R. No. L-75011) primarily challenge the IAC's rulings on whether formal notice of a counsel's change of address is indispensable for the court to take cognizance of such a change, thereby affecting the finality of judgments. Petitioners in G.R. No. L-66741 argue that the trial court had actual knowledge of Atty. Diaz's change of address, evidenced by pleadings filed at the new address and orders sent to it, making the service of the decision to the old address invalid. They also contend that Teoville's complaint was barred by the Land Registration Act. The petitioner in G.R. No. L-75011 questions the propriety of a certiorari petition filed in the IAC. The Supreme Court granted the petition in G.R. No. L-66741, reversing the IAC's decision and setting aside the trial court's orders, and denied the petition in G.R. No. L-75011, directing that the period to appeal for the respective parties commence from the finality of the Supreme Court's decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the failure of counsel to file a formal notice of change of address suspends the running of the period to appeal, and whether the trial court's sending of decisions to the old address, despite alleged knowledge of the change of address, invalidates the finality of the judgment. Whether a petition for certiorari was the proper remedy in the Intermediate Appellate Court. Whether the complaint for quieting of title was barred by Section 38 of the Land Registration Act.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition in G.R. No. 66741 and denied the petition in G.R. No. 75011. It reversed and set aside the questioned decision of the respondent court in G.R. No. 66741. The orders dated February 3, 1984, and April 19, 1984, of the trial court and all proceedings pursuant to its orders of execution were declared null and void. The period for the petitioners in G.R. No. 66741 and for the private respondent in G.R. No. 75011 to perfect their respective appeals shall commence from the date this decision becomes final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of notice of change of address and the period to appeal: The Court reiterated the principle that formal notice of a change of address is generally indispensable for the court to take cognizance of such change. However, the Court distinguished the present cases from prior rulings like Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals. In this instance, the trial judge was allegedly informed in open court of Atty. Diaz's change of address, and subsequent orders and notices were sent to the new address, with opposing counsel also furnishing pleadings to the new address. These circumstances indicated that the trial court had actual knowledge and had acted upon the change of address. The Court found it strange that only the decision was sent to the old address. Therefore, the sending of the decision to the old address was deemed improper and invalid service, which did not start the running of the period to appeal. The Court emphasized that while attorneys should always file formal notices of change of address, equitable grounds can sometimes overcome strict observance of the Rules. On the propriety of the certiorari petition: The Court affirmed that a petition for certiorari was the proper remedy. The trial court's order denying the motions to set aside the writ of execution and for reconsideration was based on the ground that the decisions had become final and executory, effectively foreclosing any further relief from the trial court. Under these circumstances, where the trial court allegedly acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, certiorari was appropriate to challenge the order of execution. On the applicability of Section 38 of the Land Registration Act: The Court clarified that while Section 38 of the Land Registration Act generally makes decrees of registration indefeasible after one year, this rule does not apply in cases of double registration. In such situations, where two parties possess certificates of title over the same property, the issue is who has the better right. The Court held that an action for quieting of title, as filed by Teoville, is a proper remedy under Article 476 of the Civil Code and is sanctioned by Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, even after the one-year prescriptive period, because the issue is not to set aside the decree but to determine the rightful owner in cases of conflicting titles. The Court cited Garcia v. Court of Appeals to support the inapplicability of the one-year prescriptive clause in cases of double registration.
Main Doctrine
The failure of a counsel to file a formal notice of change of address does not automatically suspend the running of the period to appeal, especially when the court has taken cognizance of the change of address through other means, such as orders being sent to the new address and pleadings being filed therein by opposing counsel. However, in cases where the trial court, despite knowledge of the change of address, erroneously sends the decision to the old address, the period to appeal should commence from the finality of the Supreme Court's decision.