Cojuangco v. Romillo, Jr.
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An action for declaration of nullity of marriage was filed by Maria Luisa O. Cojuangco and Spouses Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Soledad O. Cojuangco against Leo J. Palma. The complaint alleged that Maria Luisa, 22 years old and single, was unduly influenced by Palma, a married lawyer with three children, to contract a second marriage with him on June 22, 1982, by falsely representing himself as a bachelor to Hong Kong authorities. The complainants prayed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage and for damages. Procedural History: On September 27, 1982, Maria Luisa sought the dismissal of the case. Palma was declared in default on October 5, 1982, after failing to file an answer within the given period. Palma's motion for reconsideration of the default order was denied on October 25, 1982. On November 2, 1982, the lower court rendered an ex parte decision declaring the marriage null and void. Palma's motion for reconsideration of this decision was denied on February 18, 1983. The Petition: This case is an incident of G.R. No. 64538, where the Supreme Court, in a Resolution dated December 21, 1983, ordered the respondent judge to conduct a new trial and allow Palma to file his answer. The First Division of the Supreme Court noted that the respondent judge acted with undue haste in declaring Palma in default and in refusing to give due course to his appeal. The Court also highlighted that Rule 18, Section 6 of the Rules of Court expressly prohibits defaults in actions for annulment of marriage. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment and subsequent orders and remanded the case for proper proceedings. Subsequently, on July 19, 1984, an order was issued dismissing the case with prejudice, following a notice of dismissal filed by Maria Luisa. However, on August 17, 1984, the respondent judge reconsidered and set aside the dismissal order, reinstating the case and granting Palma 15 days to file an answer. A joint motion for reconsideration by Maria Luisa and Palma was denied on December 10, 1984. This led to the filing of the present petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to want of jurisdiction, in refusing to dismiss the case. Whether the order setting aside the order of dismissal is contrary to law and jurisprudence.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The case is REMANDED to the respondent trial court for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the case: The respondent Judge did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. His actions were in obedience to the Resolution of the First Division of the Supreme Court dated December 21, 1983, in G.R. No. 64538, which explicitly ordered the respondent judge to conduct a new trial and allow the petitioner (Palma) to file his answer. The Supreme Court's resolution in G.R. No. 64538 also noted that the respondent judge had acted with undue haste in declaring Palma in default and in refusing to give due course to his appeal. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Rule 18, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prohibits defaults in actions for annulment of marriage, mandating instead an investigation by the prosecution attorney if the defendant fails to answer. The respondent judge's subsequent order reinstating the case and granting Palma time to file an answer was a direct compliance with this Court's directive. Therefore, the judge cannot be faulted for following the resolution of the Supreme Court. Errors allegedly committed by a judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction are generally correctible by appeal, not by a special civil action of certiorari. On whether the order setting aside the order of dismissal is contrary to law and jurisprudence: The order setting aside the dismissal was a direct consequence of the Supreme Court's directive in G.R. No. 64538 to conduct a new trial. Palma's insistence on the dismissal of the case, despite the Supreme Court's order to allow him to file an answer and proceed with a new trial, was considered a disobedience to, if not a blatant defiance of, the Court's order, or at the very least, a bid to delay the disposition of the case on the merits. The Supreme Court generally does not entertain petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion or when the broader interests of justice necessitate an exception. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order and not appealable. In this instance, the respondent judge was merely complying with the higher court's mandate, and his actions were not contrary to law or jurisprudence. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the case was remanded for further proceedings as directed by the Supreme Court.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari questioning the propriety of an interlocutory order, such as an order denying a motion to dismiss, is generally not entertained unless the court acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, or where broader interests of justice require an exception. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.