Velunta v. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Colonel Simeon Kempis Jr.
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Rizalito Velunta, a Patrolman of the Integrated National Police (INP) of Tacloban City, shot and killed Romeo Lozano during an attempt to apprehend Lozano for traffic violations. Procedural History: Mrs. Anacorita Lozano, widow of the deceased, filed an administrative complaint for grave misconduct against Velunta, resulting in a modified decision of Less Grave Misconduct and suspension. Simultaneously, a complaint for homicide was filed with the City Fiscal's Office. The City Fiscal found prima facie evidence and recommended referral to the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan approved the filing of an information for homicide, which was then referred to military authorities pursuant to P.D. 1850 for trial by court-martial. The Petition: Velunta filed a petition for prohibition, challenging the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial, arguing that Executive Orders Nos. 1040 and 1012, effective July 10, 1985, transferred supervision and control of the INP to NAPOLCOM and the Office of the President, thereby removing police officers from the control of the Philippine Constabulary and repealing P.D. 1850.
Issue(s)
Whether the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over the criminal case for homicide against petitioner, a member of the Integrated National Police, in light of Executive Orders Nos. 1012 and 1040. Whether P.D. 1850 was expressly repealed by Executive Order No. 1040.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The General Court Martial retains jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the General Court Martial: The Court held that jurisdiction is the power vested in courts for administering justice, which must be expressly conferred by statute. Presidential Decree No. 1850 explicitly grants courts-martial exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by uniformed members of the Integrated National Police (INP) while in the performance of their duties. The subsequent Executive Orders Nos. 1012 and 1040, which transferred operational supervision and administrative control of the INP to local governments and the Office of the President respectively, did not divest the courts-martial of their jurisdiction to try criminal cases. The distinction between operational supervision/administrative control and the power to try criminal proceedings is clear; one pertains to the performance and deployment of police functions, while the other pertains to the tribunal vested with the power to impose penalties for crimes. On the alleged repeal of P.D. 1850: The Court found the petitioner's contention that P.D. 1850 was expressly repealed by Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 to be inaccurate. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 1040 provides for the repeal of laws inconsistent with its provisions, but it does not expressly repeal P.D. 1850. Furthermore, there is no inconsistency between P.D. 1850, which confers jurisdiction on courts-martial, and Executive Order No. 1040, which pertains to administrative and operational supervision. Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. The Court reiterated that jurisdiction, once acquired, remains with the military court-martial unless expressly divested by law. The implementation of the constitutional mandate for a national and civilian police force was still in progress at the time, and police forces remained part of the PC-INP structure.
Main Doctrine
Jurisdiction of a court-martial over criminal cases involving members of the Integrated National Police, once acquired, remains unless expressly divested by law, and is not affected by subsequent executive orders transferring operational supervision or administrative control of the INP to other bodies.