Belisario v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: A parcel of land, originally covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 366 pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 45183, was issued in the names of Rufino Belisario and Felipa Lauga. Upon Rufino's death, ownership was extra-judicially settled among his children and widow, with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-124 issued in their names. In 1950, the land was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a P1,200.00 loan. The mortgagors defaulted, leading to extra-judicial foreclosure. On January 31, 1963, the land was sold at public auction for P3,134.76, with PNB as the highest bidder. The Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered on July 22, 1971. On April 21, 1971, petitioners offered to redeem the property for P3,134.76, enclosing P630.00 as partial payment. PNB, on August 24, 1971, refused the tender, stating the full obligation was P7,041.41 and that payment must be in full. On February 8, 1973, PNB sold the land to respondent Vicente Cabrera for P5,000.00. Procedural History: On November 20, 1974, Cabrera filed an action for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioners and their tenants. On January 9, 1975, petitioners filed an action for Repurchase of Homestead against PNB and Cabrera. The cases were heard jointly. Cabrera filed a Motion to Dismiss the repurchase action, citing lack of tender of payment/consignation and failure to state a cause of action. Petitioners opposed, claiming they offered to repurchase from PNB within the redemption period and tendered payment, which was refused, and that they later consigned P5,000.00 with the Clerk of Court. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioners appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC), which affirmed the trial court's decision. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, assailing the IAC's decision which affirmed the dismissal of their action for repurchase.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of a judicial action for repurchase within the redemption period is equivalent to a valid offer to redeem. Whether the petitioners' offer to repurchase and subsequent consignation of P5,000.00 were timely and sufficient to preserve their right to repurchase. Whether the IAC erred in applying the doctrine in Uy Lee v. Court of Appeals and Conejero v. Court of Appeals to the present case. Whether the IAC erred in holding that the action was barred by laches.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals. It ruled that petitioners are authorized to redeem the property within thirty (30) days from entry of judgment, ordering private respondent Cabrera to execute a deed of absolute conveyance upon payment of the purchase price at the auction sale, with 1% per month interest, plus any taxes or assessments paid by Cabrera, minus the P5,000.00 consigned.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court held that the filing of a judicial action to enforce repurchase within the period for redemption is equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the effect of preserving the right to redemption. This is supported by jurisprudence, including Reoveros v. Abel and Sandoval and Tolentino v. Court of Appeals. The formal offer to redeem, accompanied by a bona fide tender of the redemption price, is essential to preserve the right for future enforcement even beyond the redemption period, but the filing of the action itself within the period is equivalent to a formal offer. The Court clarified that this rule applies when the action is filed within the redemption period, distinguishing it from cases where the action was filed after the period had lapsed. On Issue 2: The Court found that the petitioners' filing of the action for Repurchase of Homestead on January 9, 1975, was well within the five-year repurchase period, which began to accrue from July 22, 1972 (the expiration of the redemption period under Act 3135). Therefore, the question of timeliness of their subsequent tender of payment on August 1 and 4, 1977, became insignificant because the filing of the action itself preserved their right. The Court noted that the consignation of P5,000.00 was made, and while the timeliness of the tender was questioned, the filing of the suit was deemed sufficient to preserve the right. On Issue 3: The Court ruled that the IAC erred in citing Tolentino v. Court of Appeals out of context and in applying the doctrines in Uy Lee v. Court of Appeals and Conejero v. Court of Appeals. The Court explained that in Uy Lee and Conejero, the actions to compel redemption were filed after the lapse of the redemption period, making the timeliness of the tender of payment the crucial issue. In the present case, the action was filed within the redemption period, thus the filing itself preserved the right, making the cited cases factually dissimilar and inapplicable. On Issue 4: The Court found that the IAC erred in holding that the action was barred by long inaction or laches. The Court determined that the right of redemption under Commonwealth Act 141 legally began to accrue only on June 22, 1972. Consequently, an action for Repurchase of Homestead filed on January 9, 1975, could not be considered barred by laches, as it was filed well within the applicable period.
Main Doctrine
The filing of a judicial action to enforce repurchase within the period for redemption is equivalent to an offer to redeem and preserves the right to redemption, even if a formal tender of payment was not made simultaneously with the filing of the action.