Mayor v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from an ejectment case filed by Carmen M. Angeles and Edmundo M. Angeles against Pablo Mayor. The Metropolitan Trial Court initially ruled in favor of Mayor, dismissing the complaint. However, upon appeal by the plaintiffs, the Regional Trial Court reversed this decision, ordering Mayor to vacate the premises and pay monthly rentals and attorney's fees. 2. Procedural History: Following the Regional Trial Court's adverse decision, Mayor filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then sought an extension of time from the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) to file a petition for review. The IAC granted the extension, conditioned on the timeliness of the motion. Subsequently, the IAC declared Mayor's petition abandoned and dismissed it, a decision later upheld upon denial of Mayor's motion for reconsideration, on the grounds that the petition was filed one day late. 3. The Petition: This case is a petition for review of the IAC's resolutions. Mayor argues that his petition for review was timely filed within the granted fifteen-day extension. He contends that the IAC erred in its computation of the appeal period, asserting that the extension should have commenced from October 1, 1985, making October 16, 1985, the final day to file, which is when he submitted his petition. The Supreme Court is asked to determine the correct computation of the appeal period.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for review filed by petitioner Pablo Mayor with the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed within the reglementary period, including the granted extension. Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in declaring the petition for review abandoned and dismissed.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The questioned resolutions of the Intermediate Appellate Court are reversed and set aside. The IAC is ordered to reinstate the petition for review.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the petition for review: The Supreme Court found the computation of the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) to be erroneous. The Court clarified that when a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the reglementary period to appeal is the remaining period after the denial. In this case, Mayor received the denial of his motion for reconsideration on September 30, 1985. Under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the last day to perfect his appeal was October 1, 1985. The fifteen-day extension granted by the IAC was to be counted from October 2, 1985, not from September 30, 1985, nor from October 1, 1985. Therefore, the extension period ended on October 16, 1985. Since Mayor filed his petition for review on October 16, 1985, it was filed within the extended reglementary period. The Court emphasized that the extension period is added on top of the remaining period, not inclusive of the last day of the original period. The Court cited its rulings in Lloren v. De Veyra and De las Alas v. Court of Appeals regarding the computation of periods. The IAC's reliance on a different computation method was deemed incorrect, leading to the erroneous dismissal of the petition. The Court reiterated that the period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days, and if a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the movant has only the remaining period, with any extension being added to this remaining period. On the alleged error of the Intermediate Appellate Court: The Supreme Court's finding that the petition for review was timely filed necessarily implies that the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in declaring the petition abandoned and dismissing it. Since the petition was filed within the extended reglementary period, the IAC's dismissal based on the incorrect computation of the period was erroneous.
Main Doctrine
The period for filing a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, when a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, is the remaining period after the denial, and any extension granted is added on top of this remaining period, not from the last day of the original period.