Republic v. Soriano
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the liquidation of Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. The Insurance Commissioner, representing the Republic of the Philippines, initiated proceedings to liquidate the company. A key point of contention arose regarding the distribution of assets, particularly the handling of preferred claims, accrued expenses, and attorney's fees, after the company's assets were to be distributed. Procedural History: The Insurance Commissioner filed a Petition for Liquidation with Receivership and Preliminary Injunction against Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. on August 29, 1972. An order was issued on September 18, 1972, directing the Insurance Commissioner to effect liquidation and appointing the Commissioner as receiver. On June 19, 1984, the Commissioner filed a Motion for Approval of Final Liquidation Report, which was initially granted on May 8, 1985. Wellington Insurance Company, through new counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Modification of this order. The lower court, after directing notice to certain government agencies, issued an order on July 16, 1986, modifying the May 8, 1985 order by approving specific preferred claims and accrued expenses, and ordering the return of remaining assets to the company. This order became final and executory. Subsequently, the court issued an order on August 27, 1986, granting a writ of execution for the July 16, 1986 order, which included a provision for attorney's fees. A subsequent order on September 22, 1986, modified the attorney's fees to a fixed amount. The petitioner (Insurance Commissioner) then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the July 16, August 27, and September 22, 1986 orders, which was denied. The denial of this motion led to the present petition. The Petition: The petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines represented by the Insurance Commissioner, filed a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the lower court's orders dated July 16, August 27, and September 22, 1986, and to restrain the respondent judge from further proceedings. The petitioner argues that the respondent judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Specifically, the petitioner questions the legal standing of Tito Fajardo to represent Wellington Insurance Company and whether the petitioner was deprived of its day in court. The petitioner also contends that the questioned orders did not attain finality because service was made to a deputized special attorney, not directly to the OSG. The petition raises issues regarding the authority of counsel, the propriety of the orders issued, and the denial of due process.
Issue(s)
Whether Tito Fajardo had legal standing to make representations on behalf of Wellington Co., Inc. Whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the subject orders adverse to the petitioner. Whether the petitioner was deprived of its day in court when the court a quo resolved the subject Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The questioned orders were deemed final and executory due to the petitioner's failure to file its motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent Judge and affirmed the validity of the proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of Tito Fajardo's legal standing: The Court held that a lawyer is presumed to be properly authorized to represent a client, and no written power of attorney is required for appearance in court. No evidence was presented to rebut this presumption in favor of Atty. Fajardo, and Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. did not disown him as its counsel. The records showed sufficient evidence that Atty. Fajardo's services were properly engaged. On whether the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion: The Court found that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) received the questioned orders on October 14, 1986, and under the Interim Rules, had until October 29, 1986, to file an appeal or motion for reconsideration. The motion for reconsideration filed on November 10, 1986, was therefore filed out of time. Consequently, the respondent Judge did not commit any error or abuse of discretion in denying the motion and subsequently issuing the writ of execution, as his acts were legally maintainable and defensible. On whether the petitioner was deprived of its day in court: The Court stated that the denial of the motion for reconsideration, which was filed out of time, does not constitute a violation of due process. The lower court had heard the motion, and its denial for being filed beyond the reglementary period is not an absence of due process. The Court reiterated that where a party was given a chance to be heard on a motion for reconsideration, there is sufficient compliance with due process. Furthermore, the service of the questioned orders to a deputized special attorney of the OSG is binding on the OSG, as the acts of an authorized deputy bind the principal counsel. The OSG's contention that service on the deputy did not bind the OSG was without merit. The blame for the failure of the deputized attorney to act could not be placed on the private respondents.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to file its motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period, rendering the questioned orders final and executory. The Court also affirmed the validity of service of orders to a deputized special attorney of the OSG and the presumption of authority of counsel.