Ortiz v. Commission on Elections and Commission on Audit
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Mario D. Ortiz was appointed Commissioner of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) by President Ferdinand E. Marcos for a term expiring May 17, 1992. On March 5, 1986, during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution, petitioner and other COMELEC Commissioners sent a letter to President Corazon C. Aquino stating they were placing their positions at her disposal, following the example of Supreme Court Justices. On July 21, 1986, the Deputy Executive Secretary informed Acting COMELEC Chairman Felipe that the President had accepted, with regrets, the resignations of Commissioners Marquinez, Ortiz, Agpalo, and Layosa, effective immediately. Subsequently, Commissioners Agpalo, Ortiz, and Marquinez submitted applications for retirement on July 30, 1986, followed by Commissioner Layosa on August 1, 1986, invoking Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. Procedural History: The COMELEC, in Resolution No. 86-2491 dated August 13, 1986, revoked previous resolutions approving retirements and denied the applications of Commissioners Marquinez, Agpalo, Ortiz, and Layosa, stating they were not entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, without specifying the reason. Petitioner Ortiz moved for reconsideration, arguing he did not resign but placed his position at the President's disposal, had completed his term due to replacement, and was entitled to benefits under R.A. 1568, citing Article 1186 of the Civil Code and the cases of former Supreme Court Justices. The COMELEC denied his motion on October 1, 1986. Petitioner appealed to the Commission on Audit (COA) on December 18, 1986. After repeated follow-ups, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus on July 9, 1987, alleging grave abuse of discretion by the COMELEC in denying his claim. The Petition: Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari and mandamus to compel the COMELEC and COA to approve his claim for retirement benefits, arguing that the COMELEC's denial constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The respondents contended that petitioner's voluntary resignation prevented the completion of his term, rendering him ineligible for retirement benefits.
Issue(s)
Whether a "courtesy resignation" accepted by the President during the effectivity of the Freedom Constitution constitutes a resignation in the legal sense for purposes of retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended. Whether petitioner Mario D. Ortiz is entitled to retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, despite his separation from the Commission on Elections, considering that his "courtesy resignation" did not constitute a resignation in the legal sense.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the COMELEC's denial of petitioner's application for retirement benefits. It directed the Commission on Audit and other public offices concerned to facilitate the processing and payment of petitioner's retirement benefits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the nature of "courtesy resignation" and its effect on retirement benefits: The Court disagreed with the respondents' assertion that petitioner's "voluntary resignation" prevented the completion of his term. It held that petitioner's separation from government service as a result of the reorganization ordained by the Aquino government could not be considered a resignation within the contemplation of the law. The Court defined resignation as an act of giving up or declining office with a clear intention to relinquish, accompanied by the act of relinquishment and acceptance by competent authority. Petitioner's letter of March 5, 1986, placing his position at the President's disposal, lacked the element of clear intention to surrender his position. A "courtesy resignation" cannot be properly interpreted as a resignation in the legal sense because it does not necessarily reflect an intention to surrender the position but rather a submission to the will of the political authority and the appointing power. A stringent interpretation of courtesy resignations is necessary, especially for constitutional officials whose removal requires impeachment proceedings. On Mario D. Ortiz's entitlement to retirement benefits: The curtailment of his term was not attributable to any voluntary act on his part, thus equity and justice demand that he be deemed to have completed his term. His cessation from service was not a removal but an expiration of his term, akin to an official in a primarily confidential position whose tenure ends upon loss of confidence. As he is deemed to have completed his term, he should be considered retired from the service and entitled to a life pension under Republic Act No. 1568, as amended and re-enacted by Republic Act No. 6118, in the absence of proof of malfeasance or misfeasance. The Court also noted that Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, should be liberally construed in favor of the intended beneficiaries, given its remedial character and humanitarian purposes.
Main Doctrine
A 'courtesy resignation' tendered by a constitutional official during a period of government reorganization under the Freedom Constitution, which is accepted by the President, does not constitute a resignation in the legal sense if it lacks a clear intention to relinquish the position. Such separation from service, if not attributable to the official's voluntary act, should be deemed as completion of term for purposes of retirement benefits.