Damasco v. Laqui
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioner Atty. Efigenio S. Damasco was charged with grave threats for allegedly threatening Rafael K. Sumadohat with death on July 8, 1987, by stating, "BAKIT MO AKO GINAGANITO? MAGBABAYAD KA ... PAPATAYIN KITA ... MAYROON AKONG BARIL, BABARILIN KITA, TAGADIYAN LANG AKO." Upon arraignment, Damasco pleaded not guilty. 2. Procedural History: After trial, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong, Branch 59, presided over by respondent Judge Hilario L. Laqui, found that the evidence did not establish grave threats but only light threats. Damasco was convicted of light threats and sentenced to pay a fine of P100.00 and costs. Damasco then filed a Motion to Rectify and Set Aside the decision, arguing that the crime of light threats had prescribed because the information was filed on September 17, 1987, seventy-one days after the alleged commission on July 8, 1987, and light threats prescribe in two months (sixty days). The lower court denied this motion, asserting that jurisdiction, once acquired for grave threats, could not be lost even if only light threats were proven. 3. The Petition: Petitioner Damasco seeks relief from this Court, arguing that the lower court erred in convicting him of light threats, a lesser included offense, after it had prescribed. He contends that the principle established in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals prohibits conviction of a lesser offense if it has already prescribed, as doing so circumvents the law on prescription. The Solicitor General, in its comment, recommends that the petition be given due course, agreeing that the lower court's denial of the motion was improper as the issue was not jurisdiction but the prescription of the lesser offense.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioner can be convicted of light threats, a lesser included offense, when the information charged grave threats but the lesser offense had already prescribed. Whether the principle of acquired jurisdiction prevents a court from dismissing a case for prescription of a lesser included offense proven after trial.
Ruling
The petition is GRANTED, and the questioned decision is SET ASIDE. The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioner could not be convicted of light threats as it had prescribed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not be convicted of light threats, a lesser included offense, because it had prescribed. The crime was committed on July 8, 1987, and the information was filed on September 17, 1987, exceeding the two-month (60-day) prescriptive period for light offenses under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court cited the ruling in Francisco v. Court of Appeals which states that an accused cannot be convicted of a lesser offense if it has already prescribed, as this would allow circumvention of the law on prescription by simply accusing the defendant of a graver offense. The Court reiterated that prescription of a crime or offense is considered a loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute, thereby extinguishing criminal liability under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court clarified that the principle of acquired jurisdiction, which states that jurisdiction once acquired cannot be lost, is not applicable in this scenario. While the court acquired jurisdiction over the grave threats charge, the issue was not about the court's jurisdiction over the offense charged but rather the propriety of convicting the petitioner for a lesser offense that had already prescribed. The Court emphasized that the prescription of the lesser offense extinguishes criminal liability, which is a substantive right. Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly lists the extinction of the offense as an exception to the general rule that failure to assert a ground for a motion to quash constitutes waiver. Therefore, the court cannot lose sight of the prescription of the lesser offense, even if it had jurisdiction over the graver offense charged.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court clarified that a person cannot be convicted of a lesser offense, which is included in the graver offense charged, if the lesser offense has already prescribed. This principle is rooted in the substantive nature of prescription, which extinguishes criminal liability. The Court emphasized that procedural rules, such as the waiver of objections by failing to file a motion to quash, cannot diminish or modify substantive rights, including the right to claim prescription as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability, as provided by Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code and reinforced by Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.