People v. Tunhawan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On October 16, 1984, at approximately 9:00 AM, in barangay Dahilayan, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, Virgilio Lugmay was shot and killed. The accused, Virgilio Tunhawan, was charged with murder, with the information alleging treachery and evident premeditation. The prosecution presented evidence that the deceased and Artemio Tanasio were in Dahilayan to collect debts. While waiting, Lugmay was shot from behind. Artemio Tanasio testified that he saw the accused, Virgilio Tunhawan, holding a Garand rifle in a firing position about ten meters away immediately after the gunshot. Another witness, Delfin Levanta, also testified to seeing the accused holding a rifle in a firing position aimed at the victim. Romero Gawahan, who was in the vicinity, also confirmed seeing the accused with his rifle. The medicolegal officer stated that Lugmay died of a gunshot wound. The accused set up the defense of alibi, claiming he was in Malaybalay, Bukidnon, hiding due to fear of the victim's father, Teodoro Lugmay, with whom the Tunhawan family had a long-standing feud. The feud stemmed from incidents involving the burning of the Tunhawan residence and an alleged shooting of Virgilio Tunhawan by Teodoro Lugmay. An agreement was reached between the families for the Lugmays to transfer residence and for any Lugmay setting foot in Dahilayan to be considered an act of aggression. Procedural History: The Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, convicted Virgilio Tunhawan of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Virgilio Lugmay. The court found the crime qualified by treachery with aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and use of a firearm, with no mitigating circumstances. The Petition: The accused-appellant appealed the decision, assigning several errors to the trial court, including the admission of testimony regarding the distance from the accused to the victim, the credibility of prosecution witnesses (Artemio Tanasio, Delfin Levanta, Romero Gawahan), the timing of witness testimonies and affidavit execution, the relationship of witnesses to the victim, the possession of the firearm, and the failure to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in admitting that the accused was ten (10) meters more or less away from the victim and in finding the accused was present at the scene of the crime. Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witness Artemio Tanasio relative to what he saw when the accused was allegedly holding the firearm, notwithstanding his inconsistency and alleged falsity. Whether the trial court erred in admitting that witness Delfin Levanta was an eyewitness. Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Artemio Tanasio despite the fact that he only executed an affidavit and testified after eight (8) months. Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to witnesses Artemio Tanasio, Delfin Levanta, and Romero Gawahan despite their relationship to the victim. Whether the trial court erred in admitting that accused Virgilio Tunhawan was still in possession of the firearm when in truth and in fact it was already deposited with the Station Commander. Whether the trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant for failure to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, considering the elements of murder and aggravating circumstances.
Ruling
The Court affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant, Virgilio Tunhawan, for the crime of murder, with a modification in the penalty imposed. The indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 6 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum was imposed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the distance of the accused from the victim and the presence of the accused at the scene: The Court found no merit in the contention that the accused was not at the scene of the crime. The alleged inconsistencies in the accounts of the eyewitnesses related to collateral matters and did not detract from the substantial truthfulness of their testimonies, particularly regarding the vital fact of the accused's presence at the scene. Artemio Tanasio's testimony clearly established that he saw the appellant both before and after the shooting. The defense of alibi was correctly rejected as it was not established by clear and convincing evidence, and the physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene was not shown, given the travel time between Malaybalay and Manolo Fortich. On the credibility of Artemio Tanasio's testimony regarding the firearm: The Court reiterated that minor inconsistencies in a witness's testimony are insufficient to destroy credibility. The appellant's attempt to discredit Tanasio based on slight variations in his statements about seeing the accused holding the gun were deemed insignificant. The Court found Tanasio's explanation for the delay in executing an affidavit credible; he had been in hiding due to fear of reprisal from both the accused and the victim's father. This fear was a valid explanation for his initial reluctance to testify, a common occurrence in the country. On Delfin Levanta's status as an eyewitness: The trial court did not err in giving credence to Levanta's testimony. Levanta clearly stated he was conversing with Tanasio and the deceased, heard the shot, saw the accused holding the rifle in a firing position aimed at the victim, and then left due to fear. His immediate departure explained his absence from Tanasio's account of seeking help. Even if Levanta's testimony were discredited, it was merely corroborative and would not alter the trial court's conclusion. On the delay in Artemio Tanasio's affidavit and testimony: The Court found the trial court's acceptance of Tanasio's explanation for the eight-month delay in executing his affidavit to be apt. Tanasio explained that he went into hiding out of fear for his life, caught between the accused and the victim's father. His initial statement of not having seen the shooting was a protective measure. The Court recognized fear of reprisal as a valid explanation for delayed testimony, especially given the existing feud between the families and the accused's status as an ICHDF member. On the relationship of witnesses to the victim: The Court held that the relationship of prosecution witnesses to the victim does not automatically disqualify them as biased or render their testimony unworthy of belief, absent any improper motive. The defense failed to establish any improper motive on the part of Tanasio, Levanta, and Gawahan, who were related to the victim. Therefore, their testimonies were given due weight. On the possession of the firearm: The Court found the explanation for the whereabouts of the fatal weapon not credible. While the accused claimed his rifle was turned over to the detachment commander, the Station Commander admitted he did not know if it was subsequently issued to another person. Crucially, the defense's own evidence, through the testimony of the Station Commander, indicated that the accused's service rifle was surrendered to the police when the accused surrendered. This was further corroborated by Romero Gawahan's testimony that he saw the appellant holding his issue Garand rifle. On the guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the elements of murder: The Court concluded that the prosecution had proven the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Although no witness saw the actual shooting, three witnesses positively identified the appellant holding his rifle in a firing position aimed at the victim immediately after the shot. The appellant's act of walking away only after the victim fell, coupled with the absence of other persons in the area where the shot originated, sufficiently established his culpability. The existing family feud further strengthened the case. The element of treachery was amply proven, as the victim was shot from behind, suddenly and unexpectedly, rendering him unable to defend himself. However, the Court found that evident premeditation and the use of a firearm to weaken the defense were erroneously appreciated as aggravating circumstances. The killing appeared to be a sudden reaction, and there was no showing of prior deliberation. The use of a firearm was absorbed by treachery.
Main Doctrine
The Court affirmed the conviction for murder, holding that eyewitness testimonies were credible despite minor inconsistencies and that the defense of alibi was not sufficiently established. Treachery was found to qualify the killing to murder, but evident premeditation and use of a firearm to weaken the defense were not appreciated as aggravating circumstances.