Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Antonio de los Reyes filed a report in October 1974 with the Presidential Security Command (PSC) charging petitioner Francisco S. Tatad, then Secretary of Public Information, with violations of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). No action was taken. In October 1979, five years later, Tatad resigned. Two months later, on December 12, 1979, de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan, repeating the earlier charges. The Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for investigation. The CIS report in June 1980 concluded that Tatad violated Sections 3(e) and 7 of RA 3019. Tatad moved to dismiss, claiming immunity under PD 1791, which was denied. On July 5, 1985, the Tanodbayan approved a resolution recommending the filing of five informations against Tatad: (1) Violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for giving unwarranted benefits to D' Group, a corporation controlled by his brother-in-law; (2) Violation of Section 3(b) of RA 3019 for receiving P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar as consideration for releasing P588,000.00 to Amity Trading Corporation; (3) Violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 for failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for 1973; (4) Violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 for failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for 1976; and (5) Violation of Section 7 of RA 3019 for failure to file Statement of Assets and Liabilities for 1978. These informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a consolidated motion to quash the informations, citing denial of due process and speedy disposition, prescription of offenses, lack of prima facie case, and that the facts charged in one case did not constitute an offense. The Tanodbayan opposed, arguing that the filing of the complaint interrupted prescription and that BP Blg. 195 extended prescriptive periods. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash on August 9, 1985, directing the Tanodbayan to amend the information in Criminal Case No. 10500 to change the date of the offense from January 31, 1974, to September 30, 1974. An amended information was filed. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on September 17, 1985. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition. The Petition: Petitioner seeks to annul the resolutions of the Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan and to enjoin further proceedings, alleging deprivation of due process and the right to speedy disposition of cases due to the prolonged delay in the investigation and filing of informations, which he claims amounted to a loss of jurisdiction.
Issue(s)
Whether the prosecution's long delay in filing the cases deprived the petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases. Whether the crimes charged had already prescribed. Whether there was discriminatory prosecution of the petitioner by the Tanodbayan. Whether the Sandiganbayan should have ruled on the question of amnesty raised by the petitioner. Whether the alleged lack or non-existence of a prima facie case justifies the quashal of the informations.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, dismissed the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 10499, 10500, 10501, 10502, and 10503, and made permanent the temporary restraining order previously issued. The Court found the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the informations to be violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of delay and violation of due process and speedy disposition: The Court held that the inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the informations was violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases. The Court noted that the initial complaint was filed in October 1974, but the informations were only filed in June 1985, a delay of over a decade. The Court found the explanation that the delay might be due to "painstaking and gruelling scrutiny" speculative and suggested a double standard, especially since three of the charges involved failure to file statements of assets and liabilities, which did not require complicated scrutiny. The Court emphasized that while the ten-day period for resolution under PD 911 is directory, it cannot be disregarded with absolute impunity. The Court distinguished this from the absence of a preliminary investigation, which can be corrected, stating that undue delay cannot be corrected as time cannot be set back. The Court concluded that this delay was substantial and unjustified, warranting dismissal. On the issue of prescription: The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the issue of prescription due to the dismissal of the cases on the ground of violation of due process and speedy disposition. On the issue of discriminatory prosecution: The Court found that the circumstances surrounding the reactivation of the complaint after Tatad's resignation and the referral to the PSC suggested political motivation, which is improper for prosecutors to engage in. This lent credence to the suspicion that the prosecution was politically motivated, although the Court did not explicitly rule on discriminatory prosecution as a separate ground for dismissal. On the issue of amnesty: The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the question of amnesty raised by the petitioner, as the cases were dismissed on other grounds. On the issue of lack of prima facie case: The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the existence or lack of a prima facie case, as the dismissal was based on the violation of constitutional rights due to delay.
Main Doctrine
The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing the information in a criminal case is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to a speedy disposition of cases, warranting the dismissal of the informations.