De Alino v. Mendoza
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: This case concerns a dispute over a parcel of land (Lot No. 3925 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate) in Talisay, Cebu, with an area of 2,908 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2142 in the name of Benedicto Macabale. Benedicto Macabale and his late wife acquired the land before he left for Hawaii in 1931. The controversy arose when petitioners, Luciana M. de Alino, Benjamin Alino, and Hermogina M. de Unabia, claimed ownership based on a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly thumbmarked by Benedicto and his wife on March 20, 1973. Benedicto Macabale, an illiterate 78-year-old at the time of testimony, denied selling the land, asserting he only thumbmarked a new tax declaration. Consequently, Benedicto filed an action against the petitioners for Annulment of Deed of Sale, Reconveyance, and Damages with the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VI, presided over by respondent judge, ruled in favor of Benedicto Macabale in a Decision dated March 29, 1979, declaring the Deed of Sale null and void, ordering reconveyance of the land, and awarding damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal and Appeal Bond on April 16, 1979, and their original Record on Appeal on April 24, 1979. Despite the private respondents' motion to amend the complaint and the court's order to incorporate omitted pleadings, the respondent judge, in an Order dated August 17, 1979, dismissed the appeal, deeming the judgment final and executory, and granted the motion for a writ of execution. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration, filed by a new counsel without formal substitution, was denied on November 5, 1979. A writ of execution was subsequently served on the petitioners. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the August 17, 1979 Order dismissing their appeal and granting the writ of execution, as well as the November 5, 1979 Order denying their motion for reconsideration. They argued that the respondent judge exceeded his authority and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by dismissing their appeal and issuing the writ of execution. The core issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the respondent judge erred in holding that the judgment was final and executory due to the amended record on appeal being filed six days late. The Supreme Court, in its resolution, gave due course to the petition and required simultaneous memoranda from the parties.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent judge erred in holding that the judgment sought to be appealed was already final and executory because the amended record on appeal was filed six (6) days late. Whether the respondent judge erred in holding that the deed of sale covering the questioned property is null and void, and whether the accounting of fruits should commence from 1931.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The August 17, 1979 order of the CFI dismissing the appeal and the November 5, 1979 order denying the motion for reconsideration are annulled and set aside. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for review of the findings of fact of the trial court, with the modification that the accounting of fruits should commence from March 20, 1973.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the appeal: The Supreme Court reiterated the settled rule that the amended record on appeal is deemed filed on the date of presentation of the original record on appeal, provided the original was filed within the reglementary period. In this case, the petitioners filed their original Record on Appeal on April 24, 1979, which was within the reglementary period. Therefore, the subsequent filing of the amended record on appeal, even if beyond the period granted by the lower court, should be considered timely. The Court cited Vda. de Oyzon vs. Vinzon, Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, and De Mesa Abad vs. Court of Appeals in support of this principle. The dismissal of the appeal based on the perceived untimeliness of the amended record on appeal was thus erroneous. The Court excused the filing of the motion for reconsideration by a new counsel without formal substitution, citing the principle that litigation should be decided on its merits and not on technicalities, and that the interest of justice may warrant the waiver of rules to afford every party-litigant ample opportunity to present their case. On the merits of the deed of sale and accounting of fruits: The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's findings of fact regarding the nullity of the deed of sale. The Court noted that the trial judge was in a better position to assess the evidence and the demeanor of witnesses. The discrepancy between the alleged sale price of P454.00 for the land and the P20,000.00 value of the house constructed thereon, as testified by Benedicto Macabale, created sufficient doubt regarding the validity of the sale. This factual finding, being supported by evidence on record, was given great weight and not disturbed. The Supreme Court found the portion of the decision ordering an accounting of fruits from 1931 to be erroneous. Since Benedicto Macabale left for Hawaii in 1931 and his late wife administered the property, the accounting should only commence from March 20, 1973, the date when the petitioners claimed ownership, as this is when the dispute over the property and its fruits effectively began.
Main Doctrine
An amended record on appeal is deemed filed on the date of the presentation of the original record on appeal, provided the original was filed within the reglementary period. Failure to comply with the period granted by the lower court for filing an amended record on appeal, while not to be condoned, does not necessarily render the appeal untimely.