Tandoc v. Resultan
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On October 19, 1980, a criminal complaint (I.S. No. 80-198) was filed for "Serious Physical Injuries," "Slight Physical Injuries," and "Trespass to Dwelling." Subsequently, on December 2, 1980, another complaint (I.S. No. 80-233) was filed for "Trespass to Dwelling," "Serious Oral Defamation," "Grave Threats," and "Physical Injuries." The investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe that the crimes in I.S. No. 80-198 were committed, recommending the filing of Informations. The fiscal recommended dropping charges in I.S. No. 80-233, except for "Trespass to Dwelling." Informations were filed with the City Court. On July 28, 1981, respondents Arnulfo Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr., and Manuel Cancino directly lodged with the City Court four criminal complaints against herein petitioners for "Serious Physical Injuries," "Trespass to Dwelling," "Less Serious Physical Injuries," and "Grave Threats to Kill." Procedural History: On August 13, 1981, the City Court found reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged in the four new cases may have been committed and that the accused were probably guilty, ordering the issuance of warrants of arrest, which were later suspended. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration and for a re-investigation by the City Fiscal were denied by the City Court on October 21, 1981. The Petition: Petitioners seek certiorari assailing the City Court's Orders dated August 13, 1981, and October 21, 1981, questioning the court's authority to conduct a preliminary examination of charges previously dismissed by the City Fiscal and denying their motion for re-investigation.
Issue(s)
Whether the City Court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination of charges previously dismissed by the Office of the City Fiscal. Whether the filing of new complaints with the City Court after dismissal by the fiscal constitutes double jeopardy. Whether the offenses charged had prescribed at the time of filing.
Ruling
The petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners.
Ratio Decidendi
On the City Court's Authority to Conduct Preliminary Examination: The Court held that for offenses falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court, or its concurrent jurisdiction with higher courts, the complaints could be filed directly with the City Court. The City Court is empowered to conduct a preliminary examination for the purpose of issuing warrants of arrest and thereafter proceed with the trial on the merits. The preliminary investigation proper conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with in such cases. The Court cited Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which stated that in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, the accused was not entitled to a preliminary investigation proper. The preliminary examination prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, along with the sworn statements of the complainant and witnesses, is sufficient to establish whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof, thus preventing needless waste or duplication of time and effort. The Court reiterated that preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial and not a trial on the merits. On Double Jeopardy: The Court ruled that the earlier order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal did not bar the filing of said complaints with the city court on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court explained that the result of a preliminary investigation cannot constitute or give rise to the defense of double jeopardy because it is not a trial or any part thereof. For double jeopardy to lie, there must be a former judgment of acquittal or conviction rendered by a competent court. The preliminary investigation's sole purpose is to determine if there are reasonable grounds for proceeding formally against the accused, not to adjudicate guilt or innocence. Therefore, the defense of double jeopardy was untenable in this case. On Prescription of Offenses: The Court found that the crimes charged had not prescribed. The incident occurred on October 19, 1980, and the complaints were filed with the City Court on July 28, 1981, which was nine months later. The Court noted that the prescriptive period for offenses punishable by arresto mayor (like "Trespass to Dwelling" and "Grave Threats") is five years, and for crimes punishable by correctional penalties (like "Serious Physical Injuries"), it is ten years. Since the filing was well within these periods, the offenses had not prescribed.
Main Doctrine
The city court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination for purposes of issuing warrants of arrest and to proceed with the trial on the merits for offenses within its jurisdiction, even if a preliminary investigation by the fiscal was previously dismissed, as long as the offense has not prescribed and the proceedings do not constitute double jeopardy.