People v. Bustamante
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On April 8, 1980, armed men, including Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak," allegedly entered the house of Luisito and Priscilla Cruz in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. They robbed the spouses of P3,000.00 and jewelry, threatened Luisito Cruz for his car key, and tied up Luisito and his companions. Priscilla Cruz was then forcibly boarded into her own car by the armed men, including Vergel Bustamante who drove the vehicle towards Manila. During the trip, Priscilla Cruz was told they were holding her for P50,000.00 ransom. The car broke down in San Rafael, Bulacan, and they transferred to a truck. Later, in Valenzuela, Bulacan, Priscilla Cruz was left with the truck driver, and the men took a taxi. Luisito Cruz reported the incident to the police, leading to the detention and investigation of Vergel Bustamante, where Priscilla Cruz positively identified him as one of her abductors. Procedural History: In an Amended Information, Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" and others were charged with Kidnapping. After a separate trial, the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija found Vergel Bustamante guilty of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and sentenced him to death. His co-accused, Poncing Abergas, was acquitted. Due to the death penalty, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review. Following the 1987 Constitution, the death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the case proceeded as an appealed case upon the accused's election. The Petition: The defendant-appellant, Vergel Bustamante, denied participation and interposed the defense of alibi, claiming he was in Caloocan City at the time of the crime. He appealed the trial court's decision, raising several contentions regarding the amendment of the information, the conduct of a reinvestigation, and the credibility of prosecution witnesses and his alleged extra-judicial confession.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court erred in ordering the amendment of the information to include Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" without sufficient proof of identity. Whether a reinvestigation was properly conducted before the filing of the amended information. Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant based on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and an alleged extra-judicial confession. Whether the appellant could be convicted of kidnapping for ransom when the information did not allege this specific purpose and the demand for ransom was not sufficiently proven.
Ruling
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the modification that the defendant-appellant Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The death penalty imposed by the trial court is commuted to reclusion perpetua in accordance with the 1987 Constitution.
Ratio Decidendi
On the amendment of the information: The Court found the contention that Vergel Bustamante and "Dan Saksak" are not the same person to be devoid of merit. Evidence from subpoenas, return of service, court orders, and transmittal letters clearly indicated that Vergel Bustamante was also known as "Dan Saksak." Furthermore, the issue of jurisdiction over the person, which this contention affects, should have been raised before the trial court via a motion to quash, and failure to do so constitutes a waiver of the objection. The counsel's prior statement about filing such a motion but failing to do so further supports the waiver. On the reinvestigation: The contention that no reinvestigation was conducted is also without merit. A certification from the Fiscal explicitly stated that a reinvestigation was conducted pursuant to relevant laws, and that there was a reasonable ground to believe that a crime was committed and the accused were probably guilty. The defense counsel's lack of knowledge of this reinvestigation is not a valid excuse, especially since his appearance as counsel de oficio was made after the arraignment, and he himself admitted to not having studied the case thoroughly at the time. On the credibility of witnesses and extra-judicial confession: The Court held that discrepancies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses were minor and did not destroy the substance of their testimonies; in fact, they indicated that the witnesses were not rehearsed. The Court reiterated the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded the highest respect. Regarding the alleged extra-judicial confession, the Court found the prosecution's evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt even without it. The victim, Priscilla Cruz, positively identified the appellant as the driver of the car, and Luisito Cruz also recognized the appellant as the one who demanded the car key. These positive identifications were sufficient to establish the appellant's participation. On the conviction for kidnapping for ransom: The Court ruled that the appellant could only be convicted of the crime of kidnapping as charged in the Amended Information, not kidnapping for ransom. While the victim testified that she heard one of the robbers mention ransom, the element of demand for ransom was not sufficiently proven. No ransom note was presented, and there was no showing that a demand was made upon the family for the victim's return. Luisito Cruz only learned of the supposed ransom from his wife upon her return. Crucially, the Amended Information did not allege kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom. The settled rule is that an accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information. Therefore, the appellant could only be convicted of simple kidnapping under Article 267, No. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. The aggravating circumstances of use of a motor vehicle and aid of armed men were considered, leading to the imposition of the maximum penalty for that offense, which was then commuted to reclusion perpetua.
Main Doctrine
An accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that charged in the information, even if the evidence supports guilt for a graver offense, as the accused has the right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged.