Que v. Intermediate Appellate Court
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Magtanggol Que filed a complaint for estafa against private respondent Antonio Nicolas for issuing several dishonored checks totaling P7,600.00 for ordered canvass strollers. The fiscal dismissed the estafa charge for lack of merit, deeming it an accounting matter. Nicolas then filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against Que. Procedural History: The trial court, in its original decision, ruled in favor of Nicolas, awarding him P80,500.00 in damages and attorney's fees, finding that Que acted maliciously in filing the estafa charge. Que filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a second motion for reconsideration, which the trial court granted, reversing its original decision and awarding Que P10,000.00 in moral damages on his counterclaim. Nicolas appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC). The Petition: The IAC reversed the amended decision, holding that Que's second motion for reconsideration was pro forma, thus nullifying the amended decision and reinstating the original decision in favor of Nicolas. The Supreme Court reviews the IAC's decision.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent court committed reversible error in holding that petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was pro forma and therefore null and void. Whether the revived original decision of the trial court, which had been reversed on petitioner's motion for reconsideration, was in accordance with law and jurisprudence and should itself be annulled. Whether the petitioner was guilty of malicious prosecution.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the respondent court, reinstated the amended decision of the trial court, and disallowed all damages awarded in both the original and amended decisions, holding that each party must bear their own financial consequences and litigation expenses.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the second motion for reconsideration being pro forma: The Supreme Court disagreed with the respondent court's finding that the second motion for reconsideration was merely a reiteration of the first. The Court found that the second motion not only restated and reargued the first motion but also amplified it and invoked substantial grounds not previously raised. Therefore, it was not a mere repetition and did not suspend the running of the reglementary period for appeal, and the trial court did not lose jurisdiction when it acted upon it. The Court noted that while the motion did not contain a notice of hearing, the private respondent was notified and appeared, relying on a technicality rather than opposing on the merits. On the issue of whether the original decision should be annulled: The Court found that the amended decision of Judge Fernandez, which reversed the original decision of Judge Puno, was not arbitrarily reached. The detailed assessment of the facts in light of pertinent laws showed that the conclusions were the result of a careful study of the record. The Court affirmed the principle that while an original decision should not be lightly revised, this rule is not inflexible and can be departed from in the interest of justice when an objective re-examination dictates a reversal. The Court found no reversible error committed by Judge Fernandez in his appraisal of the case. On the issue of malicious prosecution: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had probable cause to file the estafa charge. The dishonored checks, the failure to make them good, and the fact that the supposedly defective goods were not returned until after the charge was filed, provided reasonable grounds for the petitioner to believe that the buyer intended to deceive him. The Court reiterated the principle that one cannot be held liable for malicious prosecution if he acted with probable cause, as probable cause signifies the absence of malice. The dismissal of the estafa charge by the fiscal's office, being summary in nature, did not constitute a definitive finding of malice. The Court concluded that the petitioner was motivated by an anxiety to protect his rights, not by ill feeling, and that the criminal complaint was a genuine protest over the abrupt stop payment order, not a mere ploy to collect a debt. Therefore, the petitioner was not guilty of malicious prosecution.
Main Doctrine
A second motion for reconsideration is not considered pro forma if it amplifies previous arguments and introduces new substantial grounds, thereby suspending the reglementary period for appeal. The existence of probable cause negates malice in the institution of a criminal prosecution, even if the charge ultimately fails.